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Abstract
This year marks the four hundredth anniversary of the Parol Evidence Rule, the rule that 
dictates that the interpretation of a written contract should be determined solely according to 
its text and not influenced by prior contradictory external information. This article uses the 
occasion to offer a feminist perspective and a fresh interdisciplinary view of the Rule. The 
analysis presents a unique contribution to the heated debate regarding the desired levels of 
formalism and textualism in present-day contract law, by using New-Historicist tools. 
Unexplored aspects of the roots of the Rule are illuminated through an in-depth investigation 
of the first case of the contractual Parol Evidence Rule, the Countess of Rutland’s Case
(1604). To examine this Case, the article suggests the use of “Legal New Historicism” –
researching both human and non-human “actors” who played a role in this Case, and re-
narrating the story of Isabel, the Countess of Rutland. This method reveals, for example, rare 
maps and romantic stories which lead to a critical look at the Rule’s total exclusion of 
context and helps to expose its gendered nature.
The article further presents a close reading of the most influential paragraph in Sir Edward 
Coke’s report of the Case. Coke’s words and phrasing, it is proposed, should not be read as 
incidental choice of language, but rather as carefully planned and, as such, reflective of the 
dominant values of the legal culture within which they were written. It is further argued that 
the choice to exclude the context is far from a mere omission. De facto it can be seen as 
actively creating and then taking into account a manufactured context – one that does not 
exist and is deeply patriarchal.  An exploration of the political and cultural contexts of 
Coke’s report explains the possible motives for establishing the Rule and phrasing it in such 
manner. It is argued that the Case played an active role in Coke’s efforts to strengthen the 
diminishing status of the Common Law, in the face of increasing threats, as a component of a 
marketing project aimed at improving the Common Law’s image without significantly 
changing its content.
Along the way the first Case is paired with an almost-twin contemporary case, which resulted 
from a Hollywood scandal, Clark v. Hannah-Clark (2003). Based upon the juxtaposition of 
this new legal narrative of Nicolette (Hannah-Clark) with the older story of Isabel (the 
Countess of Rutland), it is concluded that the flaws and biases underlying the Rule remain 
acute and call for a serious reconsideration of its justification. In this way the article offers an 
original and, hopefully, useful argument against excessive formalist textualism in present-day 
contract law. 
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4Nicolette
She lost her home.
The judge simply wrote that she “has no interest in that property”,1 but for her it was not 
merely “that property”. It was home, the place where she had lived for more than ten years, 
ever since her son was born, and she did have an interest in it – the father of her son gave it 
to her. 
So she appealed but failed again.2 Neither the legal logic of this final decision nor its 
description of the facts could be reconciled with the full story she knew too well. Yes, of 
course, she worked “for John and Lynn, husband and wife, taking care of their young 
daughter”,3 but no, that was not the reason she lived at the little cottage nearby their house. 
Why hadn’t the Judge mentioned the undisputed fact that she lived there because John, who 
once was her boss, became her lover and the father of her child? Why is there no word about 
John’s manifest insistence that she and their son live close to him while he kept his marriage; 
no mention of his frequent visits to the cottage? 
And what about the period of time when she had to move out from the cottage until “it was 
improved with a paint job, a new carpet and a new heating and air conditioning system” due 
to its “bad condition”?4 Despite the decision’s phrasing, this period (“between May 1997 and 
July 1998”) was not simply a break in her continuous stay at the cottage. It was precisely this 
break that later led John to make an effort to bring them back, and it was in order to bring 
them back that he made a deed transferring the cottage to her. As even his wife Lynn told the 
1
 The quote is taken from Judge John H. Reid’s words in Clark v. Hannah-Clark, Case no. SC063529 (not 
published) at the Superior Court of California, County of LA (Jan. 11 2002).
2
 Clark v. Hannah-Clark, Case no. B157749 (not published) at the Court of Apeal of California, Second 
Appellate District, Division 3 (Decided on May 22 2003 by Klein, Kitching and Aldrich). 
3
 Ibid, opening line of the decision. 
4 The quotes are taken from John’s brief that was submitted to the appellate court on November 22nd 2002 in 
response to Nicollete’s opening brief. 
5court, and as John himself admitted, the cottage was transferred to her “by grant deed dated 
July 24, 1998” and John did this in order “to continue his contact” with Nicolette and their 
son and “to prevent them from moving out again.”5 They moved back to the cottage, this 
time as its owners.
So if the cottage was hers, how then did she lose it? Well, as both John and Lynn told the 
court, it turned out that gifting the cottage had severe tax consequences for John.6 Upon 
realizing his error, John asked for Nicolette’s cooperation: he requested that she give the 
cottage back to him, promising to transfer it back to her again in a different method, by 
“creating a trust for [their son’s] benefit and placing the [cottage] in that trust”.7 And indeed 
on December 1998, trusting John, Nicolette returned the cottage to him – by deed – only five 
months after it was given to her. 
He did not fulfill his promise about the trust. 
She did not have it in writing. 
And that is how she lost her home.
Introduction
There is an ongoing and heated debate in contract law regarding the value of formalism
which entails loud calls for New Formalism.8 Part of this debate raises the question of 
5 The quotes are taken from section I(c) (“statement of facts”) of Lynn’s brief that was submitted to the 
appellate court on November 22nd 2002.
6
 In John’s own words, taken from his written response to Nicollete’s opening Brief: “When John’s accountant 
pointed out that this transaction raised a huge gift tax bill, John then planned to take the house back before the 
end of the year, and transfer it in the new year to his son [the name is omitted] by way of a tax free irrevocable 
trust.”
7 The quote is taken from Lynn’s brief, supra note 5. 
8 See, e.g., Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation,104 COLUM. 
L. REV. 494, 499-500 (2004) (“in recent years the debate has intensified; in the field of contracts, this new 
debate has increasingly been conducted in the language of the economic analysis of law. This flourishing of 
scholarship has followed in the wake of a wider school of thought that some have labeled the ‘new formalism.’
What is new about this new formalism, both in contractual scholarship and elsewhere, is that it attempts 
explicitly to ground formalism in functional terms; it tries to show how formal methods of interpretation help to 
6textualism:9 to what extent should the written version of the transaction be adhered to 
(formalism) – to what extent is there a place for considerations of fairness, distributive justice 
and so forth (anti-formalism)10 The greater the formalist-textual position is, the stronger the 
belief in adherence to the parol evidence rule becomes,11 and vice versa. 
In this study I will illuminate unexplored aspects of the parol evidence rule, in a manner that 
challenges and undermines the formalist-textual position from a new angle, namely a New 
Historicist one. This unique point of view provides innovative ammunition for the argument 
that excessive formalism may injure the weak – and that, therefore, a more flexible and 
inclusive approach is required.12
I first read the story of Nicolette losing her home as it was represented in the “official” 
judicial texts of both the initial and the appellate decisions.  It was a disturbing story, at least 
for a reader with a feminist chip on her shoulder,13 like me. Back then I did not know a thing 
forward practical goals such as efficiency, procedural fairness, and public accountability.”); Robert E. Scott, 
RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS A SYMPOSIUM IM HONOR OF IAN R. 
MACNEIL:The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U.L. REV. 847, 851  (2000); David 
Charny, FORMALISM IN COMMERCIAL LAW: The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842 
(1999).
9 See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1223 (1999); Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of 
Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1998); Stephen Ross and Daniel Tranen, The Modern 
Parol Evidence Rule and Its Implications for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L. J. 195 (1998).
10 See, e.g.,Alstine, Id.; Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and Torts,
2001 WIS. L. REV. 695; Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating On a Sea of Custom? Thoughts About 
the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 775 (2000); John E. Murray, Jr., Contract 
Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 869 (2002). 
11 The phrase “parol evidence rule” (or in short “the rule”) is used here as a representation of the idea that the 
terms of a written contract are not to be varied by extrinsic evidence. For a more elaborate account see, for 
example, Alstine, Id. at 1231-1241. The nuanced meanings of the rule are far beyond the scope of this piece but 
I think the complexity is elegantly captured by words written more than one hundred years ago with regard to 
the rule: “Few things in our law are darker than this, or fuller of subtle difficulties.” J. Thayer, The ‘Parol 
Evidence’ Rule, 6 HARV. L. REV. 325, 325 (1893). However, one qualification seems necessary: despite the 
broad acceptance of the textualist nature of the parol evidence rule, the rule also excludes textual evidence 
predating the integration of the written contract. I thank Prof. Gerald Frug for this clarification. 
12 See, e.g.,Macauly, Id. at 800 (“To the extent we ignore custom and courses of dealing and performance, we 
reinforce the power of the formal written contract. This, in turn, reinforces the power of those who draft those 
documents, usually the lawyers who represent those with superior bargaining power.”).
13
 Here I am using Mary Joe Frug’s categorization in tribute to the influential ideas that have outlived her. See: 
MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 57 (1992). For some of the feminist concerns see infra note 
115.
7about the parties involved, or about the Hollywood scandal that resulted from these deeds. I 
did not realize that “Lynn” is actually the celebrated actress Lynn Redgrave, or that “John” is 
the Hollywood producer John Clark.14 It just sounded rather peculiar, even unbelievable, that 
according to the law all that happened was the transfer of a $317,000 cottage as a mere gift 
followed shortly thereafter by the “cancellation and returning”15 of that same gift. Many 
questions came to my mind, but two of them were truly troubling: first, was it really a gift 
and second, did she actually mean to return it?
As to the first question: the first deed specifically emphasized that John “received nothing in 
return”.16 Is this a truthful declaration? It might be true if you are thinking in strictly 
monetary terms. It might be sincere if you are willing to ignore the value of a beloved son 
who lives nearby, as part of your family, a son that without knowing of your blood 
connection was taught to call you “papa”.17 As the jewel in the crown of the market place, 
contract law is known for its obliviousness to non-monetary aspects of life. I was therefore 
annoyed but not surprised to learn how easy it was for the judges to embrace this narrow 
definition of contractual consideration and, as a result, to adopt the wording of the first deed
as the whole truth and nothing but the truth: that the transfer of the cottage was an honest 
representation of a gift. Yet, this might be considered a marginal issue, since neither of the 
two courts decided the case on the merits of that first deed.18 They both were willing to 
assume that for a short while Nicolette did indeed become the owner of her home.  It is 
14
 The much-published Hollywood scandal might make the story more titillating but it could also give us a clue 
as to the power disparities between the parties in this Case.
15 This was the statement of the second deed as quoted by the appellate court, supra note 2. 
16
 The quote is taken from the court’s decision, supra note 2 (citing the deed).
17
 John’s brief, supra note 4. 
18
 The appellate decision, supra note 2, ends with the following words: “The [second] deed is dispositive 
because Nicolette therein reconveyed her interest in the property. Therefore, it is unnecessary to address any 
contentions by Nicolette relating the [first] deed.” (emphasis added)  
8therefore my second question and the second deed that turned out to be crucial: had she or 
had she not intended to return the gift to John?
I read the appellate decision again and found out that Nicolette had tried to argue that the 
cottage was never meant to be returned to John.  I also read how she was immediately 
silenced. The legal tool that was used to silence her emerges in footnote number 6 of the 
appellate decision:
“We observe Nicolette’s claim that she deeded the property back to John in 
December 1998 in exchange for his promise to transfer the property in trust to their 
son raises an issue as to the parol evidence rule. As indicated, the December 1998 
deed indicated it was a cancellation and return of gift which is inconsistent with 
Nicolette’s position that she deeded the property back to John in exchange for his 
promise to transfer it to their son.”19
I was startled by the strict way the parol evidence rule enabled the courts to twice read the 
written documents so narrowly and to ignore the details of this salacious story. Just as the 
courts interpreted the first deed as a gift for nothing, here again they strictly followed the 
written words of the second deed. The result was, to my eyes, a legal tale that was in fact a 
castrated story; so many details were left out that it made no sense at all. My response was to 
search for more information and to try to fill in some of the holes of this “Swiss-cheese” 
story. This is why I started to look for the parties’ briefs; this is how I learned that no one, not 
even John, denied that what the courts viewed as a simple cancellation of a gift was in fact a 
19 Id. Note that this application of the parol evidence rule is especially significant in light of the fact that 
California is most known for what Posner named a “soft parol evidence rule” (roughly that of Corbin and the 
Second Restatement of Contracts), as opposed to hard parol evidence rule (roughly the Williston, four-corners, 
plain- meaning approach), see Posner, supra note 9, at 534-538. See also, Susan J. Martin-Davidson, Yes, Judge 
Kozinski, There Is a Parol Evidence Rule in California - The Lessons of a Pyrrhic Victory, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 1 
(1995).
9much more complicated arrangement, one that wholly contradicted the final conclusion that 
Nicolette “has no interest in that property”.20
In their use of the parol evidence rule, the courts seemed willfully to ignore the voices that 
were trying to tell them what had actually happened. They disregarded not only the interested 
testimony of Nicolette but also those declarations that had come from the opposing end of the 
field, from both John and Lynn. As far as the second deed was concerned, all three sides of 
this “romantic” triangle repeated the same story. They all told how, despite the words of the 
deed noting a cancellation and return of a gift, it was obvious that at the end of the day the 
cottage was not supposed to revert to John but instead to be transferred by trust to Nicolette’s 
and John’s son. Naturally, each of the parties had their own explanation as to the motives that 
caused John to break his promise to create a trust,21 but it was agreed by everyone that the 
words of the second deed never reflected what was truly happening: everyone but the courts, 
that is. The courts were thus utilizing the parol evidence rule as a means of reshaping reality.
One might think that the use of the parol evidence rule as a legal tool for preferring 
contractual text over a fuller context is a good idea, and one might say that Nicolette is just a 
sad instance of a failed litigation. I just could not: I was concerned by the missing and 
misleading story, and I began to ask myself where and when such a rule was born and 
decided to “hit the road”. My initial intention was to go back in time in order to better 
understand the past of the parol evidence rule. Ultimately, the journey became much more 
20
 Quoting, again, Judge Reid’s words, supra note 1. 
21
 The most elaborate version may be found in John’s brief to the appellate court, supra note 4. Refraining from 
using a lawyer as a lingual mediator, John informed the courts in a very expressive manner of many events that 
ultimately were left out of the judicial decision. One of these events was the emergence of a new amorous 
relationship in Nicolette’s life. John was apparently extremely upset by the appearance of this new man, which 
he refers to in a telling way as his plumber, and his brief includes unrepeatable remarks about the race and the 
alleged criminal history of his rival. Lynn’s brief to the appellate court, supra note 5, supports this hypothetical 
motive for John’s behavior adding that “Sometime in 1998, Nicolette began her relationship with Ernesto, and 
John did not like it…There was a barrage of angry “love” emails between John and Nicolette in December 
1998…”  
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complex and intriguing. I return with a novel perspective, one which proves how 
contemporary the far past can be. What comes next is therefore a report of my journey - a 
journey to the roots of the contractual parol evidence rule, a journey not yet taken by others. 
The goal of this report is to provoke fresh reconsideration of the aging parol evidence rule. 
In the first section I describe the journey’s itinerary and elaborate on my use of New 
Historicist and feminists methodologies. Having done this, the actual journey begins and the 
second section focuses on the Countess of Rutland’s Case (the “Case”) that is considered to 
have established the parol evidence rule exactly four hundred years ago, in 1604. This part 
tells two versions of the Case’s story: first the formal and thin account, and then a thicker 
description of what appears to have happened. An analysis of the significance of the 
remarkable disparity between these two versions concludes the section, highlighting the 
gender bias that is entailed in the legal decision to ignore the thicker version, i.e. the context.  
The third section offers a close reading of the most influential paragraph in Sir Edward 
Coke’s report of the Case. Coke’s words, I suggest, should not be read as incidental choice of 
language but should instead be seen as carefully planned and as such reflecting the dominant 
values of the legal culture within which they were written. Accordingly, the fourth section
focuses on the political and cultural contexts of Coke’s report. Here, Coke’s words are read 
in light of his broader legacy and in line with his other writings about the law in general and 
contract law in particular. Considered in this way, the Case can be seen as playing an active 
and productive role in Coke’s efforts to resist the amassing threats to the Common Law: the 
admiration of Roman law, the use of oaths, and the need to distinguish law and lawyers from 
the common people. Building on this idea, I propose that the Case can be viewed as a 
component of a marketing project aimed at enhancing the Common Law’s popularity by 
offering a new and improved image of the same old product without significantly changing 
11
its real identity. A comparison between Coke’s marketing efforts and the labors of 
Shakespeare’s Portia to gain authority in court wraps up this section emphasizing the 
artificial nature of the parol evidence rule. The conclusion calls for a serious reconsideration 
of the rule’s necessity after four hundred years of an unveiled attempt to exclude real-life 
from the contractual interpretation process. 
I. THE JOURNEY’S PLAN
A. Taking the New Historicist Trail
My vehicle during this journey is going to be a New Historicist one. For most scholars “New 
Historicism” is a literary practice aimed at interpreting literary texts with culture in mind.22
Although used outside of the fictional arena, most famously by the anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz, whose works on “culture as text” inspired the literary New Historicist high-tide,23
New Historicism is seldom used in legal works.24 While I strongly believe that what I here 
name “Legal New Historicism”25 is a promising critical method, I think that its rarity 
22
 With Stephen Greenblatt as the acknowledged founder and his book RENAISSANCE SELF-FASHIONING: FROM 
MORE TO SHAKESPEARE (1980) as the book that is considered to have initiated New Historicism in literary 
studies.
23
 Much of this inspiration came from Clifford Geertz’s celebrated book THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES
(1973). The nature of this inspiration defies chronological order. As explained by the New Historicists 
Greenblatt and Gallagher: “It is a tribute to Geertz that it was not his method that seemed powerful to us (after 
all, that method was in part borrowed from literary criticism), but rather the lived life that he managed so well to 
narrate, describe and clarify.” See CATHERINE GALLAGHER & STEPHEN GREENBLATT, PRACTICING NEW 
HISTORICISM 28 (2000).  
24
 For the general argument that New Historicism is seldom used in legal works see Penelope Pether, Measured 
Judgments: Histories, Pedagogies, and the Possibility of Equity, 14 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 489, 520 (2002). 
For exceptions see, as examples: Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 89; Hendrik Hartog, 
Mrs. Packard on Dependency, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79 (1988); W. Fisher, Texts and Contexts: The 
Application to American Legal History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History,  49 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 
1084 (1997); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trails of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century 
South, 108 YALE L. J. 109 (1998) (and the works mentioned there in footnote 23). 
25
 Fisher, ibid, used the name “New Historicist Legal History” – a phrase that neatly grasps his view of the 
method as part of the larger field of “legal history” on which he focused in his article. Since I see the critical 
potential embedded in this practice I prefer to name it in a way which will also allow a wider legal use, 
including outside the legal-history arena. Compare also to Binder’s and Weisberg’s view: “Instead of seeing the 
"cultural criticism of law" as simply an application of New Historicism to law, we can see both developments as 
aspects of the emergence of a broader interdisciplinary field of "Cultural Studies" which blurs the boundaries 
between the humanities and the social sciences, viewing the phenomena studied by social scientists (including 
historians) as social texts available for interpretation and criticism”  - Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg, 
12
necessitates further development and discussion. Nevertheless, at this stage I will resist the 
temptation to do so and instead try to better explain my specific choice to apply New 
Historicism to the contractual parol evidence rule. 
First, the rule seems to the American legal mind as a given, and although many have spent 
time debating its extent, only a few have questioned its very existence. My turn to New 
Historicism is therefore an attempt to focus on this latter question of existence. Here, this 
practice can offer the option of de-familiarizing what is taken for granted by taking a closer 
look at the times of birth and the critical moments of emergence, the transference from non-
existence to existence.26
Second, despite its procedural name, the parol evidence rule influences the substantive 
question of contractual interpretation. Such interpretation becomes highly textual as the rule 
bans unwritten data, and the interpretative tool of New Historicism therefore seems 
especially appropriate to the project at hand. Highlighting this linkage between interpretation 
and the New Historicist practice, Geertz noted in a recent interview: 
“When I work in the field on anything, whether it’s something sort of airy-fairy like 
religion or something more concrete like a market, I start with the notion that I don’t 
understand it. Then I try to understand it better by tacking back and forth between 
large and little things. And that’s what you really do when you “interpret”.27
The main object of interpretation in this paper is the Case, where it is believed the parol 
evidence rule was “born”. This Case serves, in New Historicist terminology, as the “textual 
unit” or as the “cultural text” under investigation. I use the legal report of the Case in a way 
SYMPOSIUM: THE CRITICAL USE OF HISTORY: Cultural Criticism of Law 49 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1150 
(1997).
26 This “closer look” has been described as “something akin to what in optics is called ‘foveation’, the ability to 
keep an object (here a tiny textualized piece of social behaviour) within the high-resolution area of perception. 
Foveation in cultural interpretation is rather difficult because of problems of both scale and focus. The 
interpreter must be able to select or to fashion out of the confused continuum of social existence, units of social 
action small enough to hold within the fairly narrow boundaries of full analytical attention, and this attention 
must be unusually intense, nuanced, and sustained.” GALLAGHER & GREENBLATT, supra note 23,at 26.
27 John Gerring Interview with Clifford Geertz in QUALITATIVES METHODS 26 (Fall 2003).
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similar to Geertz’s use of his own field reports: as a textual unit, “an imaginative act”, a 
“made, composed, fashioned” thing,28 one which is no less suitable to literary criticism than 
the fictions that are part of the literary western canon. Indeed, the way Geertz, as an 
anthropologist, interprets his exemplary texts (his notes) is parallel to the way the legal 
reporter interpreted a legal case in England four hundred years ago. Both the anthropologist 
and the reporter can be compared to writers and the texts they composed can be read as 
“embedded in the cultures from which they come” and as texts that “possess within 
themselves more and more of the culture’s linked intentions”.29 My aim is thus to offer a 
“thick description”30 of the legal report that brought us the contractual parol evidence rule, 
and to attempt to understand the imaginative universe within which the act of reporting this 
case was a sign. 
Third, a critical look at the parol evidence rule, with its insistence on the autonomous nature 
of the contractual text and its rejection of non-textual materials, requires critical tools that 
address the specific phenomenon of textuality. Again, New Historicism seems apposite, for 
its roots lie precisely in strong resistance to literal criticism which rigidly adopts a highly 
textual approach, namely new-criticism. The New Historicist focus on anecdotes as a 
powerful vehicle in the search for meanings, in plural, seems extremely useful here: these 
anecdotes constantly cross and blur the lines of relevancy, lines between inside and outside, 
center and margins, main and subordinate, lines which the parol evidence rule so fiercely 
tries to establish and maintain. 
28 GALLAGHER & GREENBLATT, supra note 23, at 27-28.
29 Ibid, 25.
30
 The term “thick description” is not about the length of the description. It comes from the philosophical works 
of Gilbert Ryle who in his essays on thinking used it with regard to description which “entails and an account of 
the intentions, expectations, circumstances, settings, and purposes that give actions their meanings.” See ibid at 
23. 
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Fourth, it is meaningful that the parol evidence rule was founded in the last days of Queen 
Elizabeth’s reign and the first days of King James’, the early-modern times of Tudors and 
Jacobeans. This period, with the plays of Shakespeare at its core, served as the nursery for 
the development of literary New Historicism, 31 and thus could naturally be revisited by the 
same method – this time with law, instead of literature, in mind. 
Last, and apropos Shakespeare, New Historicism gives various texts the ability to converse, 
to participate in the cultural discourse of their time. It is under this New Historicist umbrella 
that I offer this kind of conversation between the chief text – the 1604 legal case – and 
Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice. To use the words of Catherine Belsey, the fictional 
text of Shakespeare could “offer definitions and redefinitions which make it possible to 
reinterpret a world we have taken for granted.”32
These five factors I have just outlined join together in one typical New Historicist desire, and 
that is to explore the ways in which the old long-forgotten textual unit that engendered the 
parol evidence rule was both culturally produced and culturally productive. This desire is 
grounded in the belief that New Historicism “entertains the possibility that any social or 
political document can be read not only instrumentally but also aesthetically, as describing 
31
 In addition to Stephen Greenblatt’s book, supra note 22, which is considered by many to have initiated the 
movement, many more New Historicist works with relation to the same period may be found. See Generally: H. 
ARAM VEESER, ED., THE NEW HISTORICISM (1989). For more examples see: Walter Cohen, Political Criticism 
of Shakespeare, in SHAKESPEARE REPRODUCED: THE TEXT IN HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY (Jean E. Howard & 
Marion F. O'Connor eds., 1987); JONATHAN GOLDBERG, JAMES I AND THE POLITICS OF LITERATURE (1983); The 
Politics of Renaissance Literature: A Review Essay, ELH 49 (1982), Recent Studies in the English Renaissance, 
in STUDIES IN ENGLISH LITERATURE (1984); Stephen Greenblatt, Invisible Bullets: Renaissance Authority and 
Its Subversion, in POLITICAL SHAKESPEARE (Jonathan Dollimore & Alan Sinfield eds., 1985), SHAKESPEAREAN 
NEGOTIATIONS (1988); Richard Helgerson, The Land Speaks: Cartography, Chorography, and Subversion in 
Renaissance England, REPRESENTATIONS 16 (1986); Jean E. Howard, The New Historicism in Renaissance 
Studies, ENGLISH LITERARY RENAISSANCE 16 (1986); Louis A. Montrose, Of Gentlemen and Shepherds: The 
Politics of Elizabethan Pastoral Form, ELH 50 (1983); Edward Pechter, The New Historicism and Its 
Discontents: Politicizing Renaissance Drama, PMLA 101 (1987); Don E. Wayne, Power, Politics, and the 
Shakespearean Text: Recent Criticism in England and the United States, in SHAKESPEARE REPRODUCED: THE 
TEXT IN HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY (Jean E. Howard & Marion F. O'Connor eds., 1987). 
32
 Catherine Belsey, Disrupting Sexual Difference: Meaning and Gender in the Comedies, in ALTERNATIVE 
SHAKESPEARES 167, 190 (John Drakakis ed., 1985). 
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the cultural forces that underlie its production and as reinterpreting cultural forms and 
norms.”33
B. Turning onto the Feminist Path
In western culture and since the days of the Odyssey a journey has been a masculine 
undertaking: Odysseus went away and Penelope, well, she waited at home. So my planned 
journey is in itself a feminist method. But in what other ways is a New Historicist journey 
connected to feminist voyages? I think it all starts with the use of “anecdotes” against the 
hegemonic order of things,34 as a way of producing counter-narratives. To grasp this 
subversive spirit, listen to the New Historicists describing themselves by saying:
 “…the undisciplined anecdote appealed to those of us who wanted to interrupt the 
Big Stories. We sought the very thing that made anecdotes ciphers to many historians: 
a vehement and cryptic particularity that would make one pause or even stumble on 
the threshold of history.”35
For feminists seeking ways to expose and resist male dominance, which is often so axiomatic 
by nature, these words represent a powerful potential. No wonder that “some of the legal 
scholars most interested in the promise of New Historicism are feminists.”36
Feminist works37 and New Historicism share not only the impulse to resist hegemony, but 
also elements of methodology.38 Among these are the tendency to avoid grand theories, the 
33 GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 477-478 (2000).
34
 One useful definition for the term “hegemonic is: “The predominant influence, as of a state, region, or group, 
over another or others.”THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH Language (Fourth 
Edition 2000),
35 GALLAGHER & GREENBLATT, supra note 23, at 51.
36
 Judy M. Cornett, Hoodwinked by Custom: The Exclusion of Women from Juries in Eighteenth-Century 
English Law and Literature, 4 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 1, 7 (1997).
37
 But not all of them. For a general updated review that also addresses the problem of essentialism using a 
narrative style see Linda E. Fisher, CREATING CONTEXT: JOURNALS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: I 
Know It When I See It, or What Makes Scholarship Feminist: A Cautionary Tale, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
439 (2003).
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attempt to refrain from abstract models and a zealous search for “the touch of the real”,39 the 
connection to lived experiences which are patronizingly excluded under the general rules of 
hegemonic disciplines. These are the methodologies I will now attempt to employ.
II. THE COUNTESS OF RUTLAND’S CASE
A. The Thin Version
The Countess of Rutland’s Case is considered to be the origin of the contractual parol 
evidence rule.40 According to this belief, the rule was born in 1604, making it exactly four 
hundred years old. A good occasion to celebrate, but also a suitable time for reconsideration. 
Even though the general principal that emerged from the Case was much quoted and is –
actually – still quoted until today,41 few are aware of its particulars.42 One main reason for 
this is that the reports of the Case provide an extremely brief and slim description of what 
had happened, what was pleaded and what was decided.43 The first and better known report, 
written by Sir Edward Coke, is less than two and a half pages long44 and the second, written 
by Sir George Croke, is even shorter – only half a page.45 However, the length of the texts is 
not the only problem for someone who seeks the legal story with its specifics. Croke’s text 
38
 Judith Lowder Newton, History as Usual? Feminism and the New Historicism, in THE NEW HISTORICISM, 
supra note 31, at 152-155.  The essay also critiques New Historicism for not being attentive enough to gender 
biases.
39
 I am using here the nifty title of the first chapter of Gallagher & Greenblatt’s book, supra note 23, pp. 20-48.
40 Friedrich Kessler Et al., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 823 (1986); Charles T. McCormic, The parol 
Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury, 41 YALE L. J. 365, 366-67 & n. 3 (1932); D. W. 
MCLAUCHLAN, THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 12 (1976); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of 
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 899 n. 73 (1985); MICHAEL R.T. MACNAIR, THE LAW OF PROOF IN 
EARLY MODERN EQUITY 138 (1999); Lawrence M. Solan, Theory Informs Busyness Practice: The Written 
Contract as a Safe Harbor for Dishonest Conduct,” 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87 (2001).
41
 For instance in 2001 in England: Bank of Credit and Commerce Imternational SA V. Munawar Ali, Sultana 
Runi Kahn and others (Appeal to the House of Lords decided on March 1st 2001, see 
http://www.lawindexpro.co.uk) [hereinafter BCCI decision].
42
 One important exception is Prof. Michael Macnair whom I deeply thank for sharing his knowledge with me. 
43 Legal historian John Hamilton Baker, one of the most prominent contemporary authorities on English legal 
history, describes the early development of law reporting as a movement from record to report. J.H. Baker, 
Records, Reports, and the Origins of Case-Law in England, in JUDICIAL RECORDS, LAW REPORTS, AND THE 
GROWTH OF CASE LAW 21 (1989).
44 Countess of Rutland’s Case (1604) 5 Co Rep 25b, 77 ER 89 [hereinafter Coke’s Report].
45 Countess of Rutland v. Earl of Rutland, Croke Jac. 29, 79 ER 23.
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does not tell us the facts at all and concentrates only on the legal principals upon which the 
Case was decided. Yet, even through Coke’s longer text – which states the facts – one finds it 
hard to grasp what the Case was all about, especially when trying to read this text today, 
from a distance of centuries. Other than “technical” barriers to the modern reader, such as the 
use of Law-French, “a totally artificial language”,46 it seems that the text itself is cryptic to 
the point where it is almost incomprehensible. It is a report of a case that refrains from telling 
us, perhaps refuses to tell us, a story. 
The little that is possible to know from simply reading Coke’s report is that Isabel, the 
Countess of Rutland and the widow of Edward, the 3rd Earl of Rutland, sued Roger, the 5th
Earl of Rutland. At the heart of these legal proceedings stood a manor called Eykering House 
and additional land of unclear nature named the “Lady Park” – both located in “the county of 
Nottingham”. It appears from the thin description in Coke’s report that the Countess blamed 
the Earl “for breaking her house and close”, but no further details are provided regarding this 
occurrence. There is no hint as to the nature of this breaking but, at any rate, we are informed 
that the Earl’s response was “not guilty”. We are then told (in a very complicated manner) 
that the dispute between the Countess and the Earl arose from a conflict between two written 
contracts that were both made by the late Edward Earl of Rutland with regard to the property, 
i.e. Eykering House and the Lady Park. In the first contract Edward covenanted (contracted 
by deed) with several trustees that he would convey to them the property in order to ensure 
his own and his wife’s use of the property, during their life together. The covenant went on to 
say that if he, Edward, died first – his wife, Isabel, would have the right to use the property 
for the rest of her life. According to this covenant it was only after the Countess’ death that 
46
 David Ibbetson, Law Reports in England from 1603 to 1660, in LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN 121 (1995).
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the property was supposed to fall into the hands of Edward’s heirs, who where represented by 
Roger, the current Earl of Rutland.
More than half a year later another written contract was made by the same Edward. This later 
contract dealt with a much larger parcel of land which contained many properties including
Eykering House. This time the list of trustees was longer and they were supposed to make 
sure that the specified lands, including the disputed property, were transferred in male-tail 
only, which means from Edward directly to his male heirs without any rights whatsoever to 
be given to Isabel the Countess.
With regard to Eykering house and the Lady Park the question was thus which of the two 
contracts should govern: the first, which would enrich the Countess, or the second which 
would supplement the current Earl’s fortune. Importantly, the witnesses’ testimony came into 
the picture not as an independent source of information separate from the writings, but as a 
support for one of the two rival documents. As Coke’s report tells us:
“…it was proved by diverse witnesses that the said Earl Edward…told them, that the 
said countess should have the manor of E[ykering] for her jointure.”47
It appears that no one knows for sure whether Isabel, the Countess, or Roger, the Earl, won 
the Case. What is known through the reports is only the directory to the jury made by the 
judges. Chief Justice Popham, together with “all the court”, was reported by Coke as setting 
the general rule that a written deed will bar parol evidence. The reasoning was, in Coke’s 
much-quoted words, that:
“…it would be inconvenient that matters in writing made by advice and on 
consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of the 
47
 Coke’s report, supra note 44, at 89-90.
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parties should be controlled by averment of the parties to be proved by the uncertain 
testimony of slippery memory.”48
Ironically, the first parol evidence rule’s case was not decided upon this general rule and in 
fact the jury was instructed to hear the witnesses despite the presence of a written deed. The 
reasoning behind this outcome has its roots in the Early-modern legal way of conveying land 
and is difficult to explain based solely on Coke’s report alone. In the early 17th century the 
declaration of a trust was only the initial step in the process of gaining the landowner’s 
control over the future of his properties. In order to finalize the transaction a further (and 
crucial) step was needed. Edward, the grantor of the property should have, in Coke’s words, 
“acknowledged” his obligation to the trustees and the beneficiaries by executing a suitable 
“fine”. A fine was an artificial and fictional legal practice in which the grantor of the land 
was sued by the people who were supposed to receive it. In practice, such a suit was not 
litigated but instead a settlement was achieved and approved by the courts. In order to 
constitute a valid contractual obligation this settlement had to be congruent to the primary 
deed and that is exactly where the two deeds of our Case failed. Although Edward did 
“acknowledge” both his first specific deed and his second more general one, on two 
consecutive days, it seems that “the fines actually levied were inconsistent with either 
deed.”49 Presumably it was because of these special circumstances that the judges decided to 
allow parol evidence.50 However, as I note above, the Case is better known for its setting of 
48 Id. 90. the quoted words became proverbial, and others even generalized them to include written documents 
of a non-contractual nature. See Powell, supra note 40, at 948.
49
 See Macnair, supra note 40, at 139. The fine regarding the first deed was levied after the deadline set in the 
deed, while the fine regarding the second deed was probably levied without mentioning the Eykering house. 
Support for this may be found in Moore’s report regarding the Countess’ unsuccessful attempt to litigate the 
same matter in the Wards. See Le Countee De Rutland Case Moore (KB) 723 (1592) (“Another fine was levied 
of the other lands, but not of Eckering to the persons named in the second indenture…”). Note the French-like 
name of the case, which nicely demonstrates the Law-French phenomenon.
50
 These special circumstances also disrupt the chronological order of prior and later between the two written 
documents, an order which might have been crucial, at least under a modern parol evidence rule. For another 
hypothesis see infra note 83. 
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the general rule forbidding the parol evidence than for its concrete conclusion to allow such 
evidence in the dispute resolution at hand.
To sum up the thin version of the story, we could say that Isabel and Roger held 
contradicting documents that gave each of them the exclusive rights to Eykering House (and 
the Lady Park). Isabel had in addition several witnesses to support her claim and the court 
allowed hearing them as an exception to the more general rule that it had just made: the parol 
evidence rule. This is indeed a poor story: who are these people, what were they fighting 
over, and why, what is (or at least might be) the explanation for such great inconsistencies 
between the legal devices? In the next section I will try to deal with these questions by 
sketching a thicker version of the story.
B. A Thicker Version
1.  The Main Characters
In constructing a thicker version of the Case, I will first focus on its three main characters. 
Viewing both humans and non-humans as active “actors” in the emerging plot, I will then 
continue with the disputed land itself, and conclude the review, briefly, with two additional 
minor characters. 
I will open with Isabel, the Countess of Rutland who gave the Case its name. However, it is 
worth emphasizing that researching a female figure, especially one from the Early-modern 
times, is a much more complicated task than collecting information on her male counterparts. 
a. Isabel Manners
Isabel was born in Vale Royal in Cheshire on an unknown date, to Juliane Jennings and 
Thomas Holcroft.51 As such she did not originally belong to the English aristocracy of her 
51
 Her father, Thomas Holcroft, was also born in Vale Royal. 
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time,52 a fact of great importance to our story. Isabel joined the nobility via her marriage to 
Edward Manners, the 3rd Earl of Rutland, on 1573, by which she became the Countess of 
Rutland. While married to Edward, Isabel enjoyed a luxurious life. She resided mostly in the 
lavish Belvoir Castle – the residence of the Earls of Rutland back then and the seat of the 
Dukes of Rutland in our time. Her journey to London with her husband in 1586 involved 
“forty-one servants, including a chaplain, trumpeter, gardener and apothecary.”53
In 1575 Isabel gave birth to her only child – a daughter named Elizabeth – who according to 
the rules of the period could not be the heir of most of the family’s estates. The fact that 
Isabel and Edward had no male heir to inherit most of the family’s properties created a 
serious and ongoing conflict between Isabel, who outlived her husband, and his male heirs. 
So bitter were the relationships that Edward’s younger brother John (Isabel’s brother in-law), 
who became the 4th Earl of Rutland, tried to prevent her from receiving what was clearly 
promised to her under her late husband’s will – claiming that the huge payment for Edward’s 
funeral should first be paid in full out of her share.54 Isabel had to sue her brother in-law and 
seemed to have won, if only partially, when the issue was decided by arbitrators, including 
Lord Burghley, an important figure in our thickening story. John’s revenge was to try to take 
from Isabel the custodial rights over her young daughter, maintaining that her bourgeois 
ancestry made her an unsuitable guardian for a great lady. Evidently, Edward’s male heirs 
were extremely unhappy about his decision to marry Isabel, especially since they had to 
support her throughout her widowhood after she contributed little, or nothing, to the family’s 
fortunes. However, it is quite clear that it was the lack of a son that required Isabel to fight so 
52
 Her father, Thomas Holcroft was described as “the younger son of an undistinguished county landowner…” 
but his ambition and his many talents had led him to economic success as well as to political achievements and 
on 1544 he was knighted.
53 THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY (founded in 1882 by George Smith, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1949-1950), Vol. XII, 933 [hereinafter DNB].
54
 Anastasia B. Crosswhite, Note: Women and Land: Aristocratic Ownership of Property in Early Modern 
England, 77 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1119, 1132-1134 (2002). 
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desperately for her rights; just as she had to do later – in the Case we are dealing with –
against John’s son Roger, the 5th Earl of Rutland.55
b. Edward Manners
Edward Manners, the 3rd Earl of Rutland, was born in 1549 to an aristocratic family and was 
the eldest son of Henry, the 2nd Earl of Rutland. When he was 14 years old his father died 
and he was made one of the Queen’s wards under the close charge of Lord Burghley. It was 
this powerful man who took care of the young boy’s fine education in “Oxford, Cambridge 
and possibly Lincoln’s Inn”56 and indeed Edward was later described as a learned man and a 
profound lawyer. His legal talents were so remarkable that the Queen appointed him, on 
April 12, 1587, to the distinguished position of Lord Chancellor, a title he held for only a few
days until his sudden death. During his life Edward showed both business skills and 
administrative abilities and the Earldom of Rutland was described as flourishing under his 
hands.57
A salient feature of Edward’s profile was his decision to marry Isabel. In a society obsessed 
with status and hierarchy, as Tudor England was, marriage was a key issue. Far from 
contemporary romantic images associated with the idea, marriage had a highly functional and 
pragmatic role, especially for members of the aristocracy. What was perceived as “good 
marriage” had little to do with love or with the quality of the relationship of the spouses; 
instead it was more about social rank, political power and, above all, property. The decision 
55
 The fact that due to Edward’s will those male heirs stood to lose a considerable additional amount of property 
to Elizabeth, Isabel’s only daughter, surely added to the hostile atmosphere.
56 LAWRENCE STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE: STUDIES IN ARISTOCRATIC FINANCE IN THE SIXTEENTH AND 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 172 (1973) [hereinafter STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE].
57 STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, Id. at 174 : “after [Edward’s] death Sir Gervase Clifton told his brother and 
heir to reflect on ‘how barely he was left and how well he left you...”.
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whom to marry was seldom a matter of individual choice but rather a crucial part of a 
familial strategy. One major objective of such family planning was, to use Lawrence Stone’s 
words, “the acquisition through marriage of further property or useful political alliances.”58
In other words, in those days of “arranged marriages” it was not only the groom marrying the 
bride but, in a sense, his whole family marrying the bride’s family.59 Other than the obvious 
aspirations to promote the family’s status by means of the “proper” wedding, there were two 
additional factors that played a role in shaping this familial perception of marriage, both of 
them tightly connected to our story. The first was the dowry: the considerable amount of 
property, or, in its absence, of cash money (“portion”), that had to be transferred from the 
family of the bride to the family of the groom in order to facilitate the marriage. In return for 
that fortune the bride was guaranteed an annual sum to support her in the event of 
widowhood, or a jointure – a term which plays an essential role in the Case. The burden of 
financing the daughters’ dowry was heavy enough to make it a rational strategy for the whole 
family to cautiously choose its recipient. The wealth and the trustworthiness of the potential 
groom’s family were relevant both in terms of the safeguard the jointure would assure the 
bride and in terms of the ability of the bride’s family to pay for the marriages of its other 
daughters as well. 
The second factor was the primogeniture, a principal according to which the eldest son in 
each family inherited all its assets. The other children, both daughters and younger sons, 
were hence dependant economically on their father and later on his sole heir, their elder 
brother. This principal contributed immensely to the importance of the eldest son’s marriage, 
since in each family he was the one with the better upwardly mobility chances – he was more 
58 LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800 37 (Abridged edition, 1979) 
[hereinafter STONE, SEX AND MARRIAGE]. 
59Id. at 72.
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likely to marry a wealthy bride accompanied by a hefty dowry that would add to the family 
assets and would suffice to cover the portions of his sisters. 
It was against this concrete background that Edward decided to follow his heart and to marry 
Isabel. Taking into account the cultural and economic forces of the period sheds a light upon 
such a decision and enables us to better comprehend its meaning. As the eldest son of his 
most respected aristocrat family,60 Edward’s marriage was of utmost importance and yet it 
appears he assumed the freedom not only to marry far beneath his social rank, but also to 
upset his family’s expectations of a substantial dowry. For one thing, this marriage is 
presumed to have been considered at the time as mésalliance,61 “a union between two people 
that is thought to be unsuitable or inappropriate”.62 More than that, it was claimed by Isabel’s 
mother “that the Earl was so deeply in love that he was willing to marry the girl even without 
a marriage portion”.63
But Edward’s marriage was more than mere noncompliance with the cultural norms of his 
time.64 It seems essential to understand that he preferred Isabel to several other brides, far 
more appealing in terms of money and position, and furthermore, had put his very future (and 
consequently that of his younger siblings as well) at risk. As mentioned earlier, when Edward 
60
 In his explanation for choosing the Manners as one of the few families which his book deals with Lawrence 
Stone writes that: “all the examples are drawn from the very topmost ranks of the aristocracy, an elite within 
elite, members of a group which in France was known as ‘Les Grandes’.” See STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, 
supra note 56 , at xv. Later Stone goes on to present the Manners as a family that “… rose in the late fifteenth 
and early sixteenth centuries to become one of the leading members of the country’s great landed aristocracy.” –
Id. at 165. After describing the massive acquisition of land by the Thomas 1st Earl of Rutland Stone adds: “The 
result of this gigantic investment in real estate was to make the Manners family a major social and political 
force both in the north midlands, in Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire’ and Lincolnshire, and also in the north, in 
Yorkshire.” – Id. at 167.  
61Id. at 173.
62 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (http://dictionary.oed.com) [hereinafter OED].
63 STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, supra note 56, at 173 (emphasis added). This claim might be honest since, in 
Stones words: “No marriage contract has in fact survived, so there is no means of knowing whether or not the 
Earl obtained a substantial cash sum on his marriage with Isabel on 1573.” My own correspondence with the 
representatives of Belvoir Castle supports the above conclusion of Stone regarding the lack of marriage 
contract.
64
 But compare to Hill’s claim which criticizes the assumption that love before marriage was rare at the end of 
the sixteenth century. CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF CHRISTOPHER HILL (VOL. 3): PEOPLE 
AND IDEAS IN 17TH CENTURY ENGLAND 203 (1986).
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married his father was already long dead and his future as well as all of the family’s estate 
was controlled by William Cecil, Lord Burghley, the powerful guardian of the Elizabethan 
aristocracy.65 Despite his general obedience to his influential guardian,66 Edward refused 
Burghley’s suggestion to marry his daughter, an offer that few would have dared to decline 
and many would have loved to take up.67  The exceptional nature of Edward’s decision to 
marry Isabel should therefore be viewed in a multilayered way, taking into account its many 
dimensions that, combined together, reinforce the impression that this rare marriage could 
only have been based upon love.68
c. Roger Manners
The 5th Earl of Rutland and the defendant in our Case was born in 1576 as the eldest son of 
John, the aforementioned 4th Earl of Rutland who fought so bitterly against Isabel.69 When 
his father died Roger was still under-aged but wealthy enough to induce Lord Burghley to 
engage himself in a fierce contest over the young Earl’s ward. This contest was won by 
Burghley, previously Edward’s guardian and now entrusted by the Queen with the custody 
over another Earl of Rutland, Roger.70 One of Burghley’s first moves as a warden was to 
order Roger’s mother, Elizabeth, to send Roger back to Queens’ College in Cambridge, 
65
 Since Lord Burghley was included in the text of Coke’s report, I will discuss his character in more detail 
below. See text next to footnotes no. 99 to 101.
66
 Edward is described as one of the most obedient and grateful wards of Lord Burghley, a fact that makes his 
refusal to marry his mentor’s daughter even more significant. See STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, supra note 
56, at 172-173.
67 He is also reported to have given up other beneficial marriage options: “After negotiations with several other 
ladies like Frances Howard (daughter of Lord William Howard of Effingham, later Countess of Hertford) and 
Elizabeth Hastings (dau. of Francis, second Earl of Huntingdon, later Countess of Worcester), he married… 
Isabel…” DNB, supra note 53, 934. The words in italics do not appear in the DNB and are taken from 
http://www.tudorplace.com. It is fascinating to know that it was the same Edward that years later 
insisted his daughter to marry upwardly, a command she obeyed by marring Lord Burghley’s grandson, Sir 
William Cecil the 2nd Earl of Exeter. STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, Id. at 175 and 177.
68
 Additional support for this conclusion might be found in Edward’s will in which he was very generous 
toward his widow. See STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, Id. at 175; Crosswhite, supra note 54, at 1133-1134.
69
 See the text next to supra note 54.
70 STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, supra note 56,  at 177. The fact that this was the second time that Burghley 
obtained control over an Earl of Rutland serves as another indication of his deep involvement in the lives of the 
Manners.
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where he was educated for many years. The tension between Burghley and Elizabeth was so 
acute that Roger had to ask his permission to visit his own mother. 
So different from his talented late uncle Edward, Roger seems to have been a big 
disappointment to his mentor, both in terms of education and in terms of business skills. 
While tracking the young Earl’s expenses Stone notes: “Though he did buy a Livy, it is 
noticeable that it was in translation, and his very limited expenditure on books suggest a 
young man of some natural intelligence but who had failed to master the classics and whose 
main interests lay elsewhere.”71 Roger was quite adventurous and spent a lot of time 
traveling the world, probably more than he could afford himself as the head of the Earldom. 
When Roger was not even twenty, and shortly after his mother’s death in 1595, Lord 
Burghley approved his journey to the continent – but wrote bluntly that the young Earl knew 
very little about his estate.72 It was in Paris, toward the end of his “Grand Tour” in 1597, that 
he first met the Earl of Essex, an acquaintance that would have enormous influence on his 
life as well as an interesting effect on our legal story.73 Charmed by Essex, Roger followed 
71 STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, Id. at 179. Titus Livy (59 B. C. to A. D. 17), the famous Augustan historian, 
was born in the Northern Italian city of Padua. His History of Rome was and still is one of the most popular 
pieces of classical literature. But compare Stone’s conclusion to an opposite view of the same Roger made by 
those who see him as possibly the actual author of Shakespeare's works. The general argument is that Roger 
was Shakespeare because, among other things, his life parallels that of Shakespeare's life as presented through 
the Plays. For instance Roger was an English ambassador to Denmark, and when he had studied at Padua 
University in 1596, two of his fellow students were named Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. See ILYA GILILOV,
THE SHAKESPEARE GAME: THE MYSTERY OF THE GREAT PHOENIX (Trans. by Gennady Bashkov et al. 2003); 
PETR SERGEEVICH POROHOVSHIKOV, SHAKESPEARE UNMASKED (1940). John Mitchell's WHO WROTE 
SHAKESPEARE (1996) offers an enjoyable survey of the authorship question.
72
 DNB, supra note 53, Vol. XII, at 940.
73 Robert Devereux, the 2d Earl of Essex (1567–1601) was an English courtier and favorite of Queen Elizabeth 
I. Succeeding to the earldom on the death of his father, he too (like Edward and Roger Manners) came under the 
guardianship of Lord Burghley. He distinguished himself in action while serving (1585–86) as a cavalry officer 
in the Netherlands under his stepfather, Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester. When he returned to England he soon 
became a marked favorite of the queen. Essex became a national hero when he shared command of the 
expedition that captured Cádiz in 1596, but he failed the next year in an expedition to intercept the Spanish 
treasure fleet off the Azores. In 1599, at his own demand, he was made Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and sent 
there with a large force to quell the rebellion of the earl of Tyrone. Failing completely to accomplish his 
mission, he made an unauthorized truce with Tyrone and returned to England. He was confined by the Council, 
and it was eight months before he was tried for disobedience by a special council and deprived of his offices 
(1600). He was soon released but was banned from the court. Still popular, Essex planned a coup that would 
oust the enemy party and establish his own about the queen. To this end he sought support from the army in 
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him to the Azores and continued to ignore the rising need for his involvement in his family’s 
businesses. In the years that followed, Roger is described as a reckless spender who would, 
for instance, pay huge amounts of money for princely clothing. According to Stone, his “rate 
of expenditure was almost certainly higher than of any other private individual in the 
country”.74 That irresponsible attitude, combined with the need to pay for his sisters’ 
marriages led Roger and his dependants into a severe economic crisis that lasted from 1601 
to 1606,75 significant years in the legal fight with Isabel. There can be no doubt that in those 
years Roger found himself under heavy financial pressure. He had to borrow large sums of 
money for mortgage and was also quoted as requesting Royal help while stressing “the 
weakness of my estate and greatness of my debts”.76
What had deepened the crisis even more was Roger’s involvement in the Essex revolt, for 
which he was fined by the Privy Council on May 1601 the enormous sum of £30,000.77 This 
incident was not only an economic disaster but also one of Roger’s most serious mistakes 
and further proof of his impulsive nature. As I have already mentioned, Roger was one of 
Essex’s admirers and close friends, so on February 8th 1601, when Essex called his 
supporters for help, Roger did not hesitate and immediately gathered around Essex’s house. 
It is worth mentioning here that Lord Essex’ relationship with Queen Elizabeth had just 
reached its lowest point ever. Only months after Sir Edward Coke – as one of Essex’s 
prosecutors for his Ireland fiasco – dared to blame the Earl for disloyalty, the Queen was 
ready to follow him and distrust her favorite Earl. New indications arose and she was now 
Ireland and opened negotiations with James VI in Scotland, but these efforts failed. The sad ending of Essex’ 
life – in which Roger was so heavily involved – is discussed below. See DNB, supra note 53, Vol. V, at 875-
890.
74 STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, supra note 56, at 180.
75
 For details and numbers see Id. at 182-184.
76 Id. at 184.
77 Id. at 182. 
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even more convinced that Essex was indeed plotting against her.78 The Privy Council sent for 
Essex, they had questions to ask. Essex claimed to be ill and refused to come.
“No sooner was the messenger gone than the Earl received an anonymous note, 
warning that he was in danger and had best provide for himself. Essex sent out 
runners over the city; all night they spread the alarm…”79
It was in response to this alarm that Roger was waiting at dawn in front of Essex’s house, 
together with several other Earls and hundreds of gentlemen. He was standing there on this 
Sunday morning when a special and much respected mission sent by the Queen arrived at the 
courtyard; among them was Chief Justice Popham – the leading judge in our Case. As if to 
prove the Queen’s suspicions, Essex led his honorable guests to his library and… locked 
them in! He then left home and ran to the streets waving his swords and yelling “For the 
Queen, for the Queen!” His aim was the royal palace, but to Essex’s grief not many were 
willing to risk themselves and join him and his small group of followers, Roger included.
78 ALLEN D. BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE AND THE ELIZABETHAN AGE 276-280 (2003). Following Essex’ 
disgraceful failure in Ireland (see supra note 73) he was put under house arrest but the Queen released him after 
a while. Then two major events occurred: the first was the completion of the legal proceeding against Dr. 
Hayward who wrote a history book about a king who was deposited and murdered for his ill governance. It was 
Coke who forced a confession out of Hayward and who wanted to use the dedication to Essex in order to bring 
charges against the Earl too. Finally no charges were formally brought but the Queen ordered the renewal of the 
home arrest of Essex.  The second event was the special performance of Shakespeare’s Richard II, on Saturday 
February 8th 1601, an event that was organized on Essex’ behalf and paid for by his aids. Richard II, written 
around 1595, is the first play in Shakespeare's second "history tetralogy," a series of four plays that chronicles 
the rise of the house of Lancaster to the British throne. Richard II, who ascended to the throne as a young man, 
is a regal and stately figure, but he is wasteful in his spending habits, unwise in his choice of counselors and 
detached from his country and its common people. When he raises taxes to fund his pet wars in Ireland and 
elsewhere, both the commoners and the king's noblemen decide that Richard has gone too far. Richard has a 
cousin, named Henry Bolingbroke, who is a great favorite among the English commoners. Early in the play, 
Richard exiles him from England for six years. When Richard unwisely departs to pursue a war in Ireland, 
Bolingbroke assembles an army and invades England in his absence. The commoners welcome this invasion 
and, one by one, Richard's allies in the nobility desert him and defect to Bolingbroke's side as he marches 
through England. By the time Richard returns from Ireland, he has already lost his grasp on his country. 
Bolingbroke is crowned King Henry IV while Richard is imprisoned in a remote castle. There, an assassin (who 
both is and is not acting upon King Henry's ambivalent wishes for Richard's expedient death) murders the 
former king. The Queen is known for saying later: “I am Richard the Second, know ye not that.” See BOYER, Id. 
at 286-287; DNB, supra note 53, Vol. V, at 886.
79 CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 
(1552-1634) 132 (1956).
29
After a violent encounter with a few soldiers Essex fled back home by boat, only to discover 
that his hostages were gone. 
“By midnight, Essex was in prison and his friends captured: the Earls of Southampton
and Rutland; the Lords Sandys, Monteagle, Cromwell; Sir Gilly Merrick…Desperate 
men; ruined men, now, scattered in prisons throughout the city.”80
On May 19th 1601 Essex was brought to trial and his prosecutor was none other than Coke, 
who bought himself worldly glory through this trial. Preparing himself for his big 
performance, Coke wrote himself lengthy notes which indicate how central Roger’s 
involvement was perceived to be.81 At a crucial point in the trial Coke called Chief Justice 
Popham as a witness and, “Wrapped in the majesty of judicial scarlet, Popham stepped from 
the bench and stood waiting for the first question.”82 Popham testified in detail not only about 
his traumatic imprisonment, but also about things he heard while crossing Essex’s courtyard 
on the way to his house. It is probable, therefore, that he also recognized our Earl of Rutland 
standing there on this Sunday morning.83 By the end of this long day of legal hearings,84
Essex was found guilty of treason and was beheaded. 
The Earl of Rutland was more fortunate: his life was saved but he suffered a substantial fine, 
larger than that of any of Essex’ other followers, a fact that serves as a further indication of 
just how seriously his contribution to the plot was perceived. At any rate, based on a gloomy 
description of his financial plight this fine was later reduced (to around £20,000); the 
remainder was never enforced and finally was cancelled by King James.85
80 BOWEN, Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
81 BOYER, supra note 78, at 281: “Traitors’ names, Coke writes in the margin of his memorandum, and begins 
taking examinations. The Earl of Rutland, Bridget Patron’ cousin, confides in his kinsman. Coke examines 
other witnesses…[list]” (emphasis added).
82 BOWEN, supra note 79, at 149.
83
 This might have influenced his decision against Roger in our Case and could explain the puzzling exception 
to the newborn parol evidence rule.
84
 For a vivid and detailed description see BOWEN, Id. at 139-159.
85
 Stone, Family and Fortune, supra note 56, 183.
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d. The Disputed Land - Eykering House and the Lady Park
Bruno Latour has explained how non-human objects may play an important role in a story.86
Inspired by such theories,87 it seems valuable to take a detour to Nottinghamshire, England, 
where the manor over which Isabel and Roger fought once stood. What was named in Coke’s 
report of the Case as “Eykering” is to be found today in Eakring (note the slight change of 
spelling) – a village in the center of Nottinghamshire.88 “Eykering” was indeed one of the 
several spellings of this place’s name, a spelling that apparently evolved from the Old-Norse 
origins of the name as “Eikhringr”, meaning a ring of oaks.89 It is unclear exactly how and 
when this property came into the Manners’ hands, but in the Doomsday survey of 1086, 
Eakring was listed as Echering and most of the village and its lands were divided between 
two manors.90 One of these manors was handed down through the Eakring family, the 
Lexingtons, the De Suttons and finally the De Roos family, which merged with the Manners 
and became the Earls of Rutland.91
86
 Bruno Latour, The Historicity of Things: Where Were Things: where were Microbes before Pasteur?, in 
PANDORA’S HOPE: ESSAYS ON THE REALITY OF SCIENCE STUDIES 145-173 (1999). Latour suggests that "it is 
precisely when turning towards the non-human elements [material artifacts] that the polemical, controversial 
and strategic discourse should increase, not decrease." 
87 Thomas F. Gieryn, “What Buildings Do?” 31 THEORY & SOC'Y 35-74 (2002). One of the most renowned 
works about buildings is Pierre Bourdieu’s, The Kabyle House or the World Reversed in BOURDIEU, ALGERIA 
1960 (1979).
88
 There has been a great variation in spellings over the centuries, all of which were pronounced as “Aykering”. 
The pronunciation has changed only in recent years to match the modern spelling.
89
 Old Norse is the language spoken and written by the inhabitants of Scandinavia around 1000 A.D. and earlier. 
The modern Nordic languages of Swedish, Danish, Norwegian, Icelandic and Faroese descended from Old 
Norse. The original Old Norse ‘Eik-hringr’ dates back to the mid-9th century when the Danish settled in the 
English Midlands.
90 THE DOOMSDAY BOOK is a great land survey from 1086, commissioned by William the Conqueror to assess 
the extent of the land and resources being owned in England at the time, and the extent of the taxes he could 
raise. The information collected was recorded by hand in two huge books which provide extensive records of 
landholders, their tenants, the amount of land they owned, how many people occupied the land (villagers, 
smallholders, free men, slaves, etc.), the amounts of woodland, meadow, animals, fish and ploughs on the land 
and other resources.
91
 Correspondence with Mr. Mark Dorrington, Principal Archivist of the Nottinghamshire Archives. The merge 
of the Manners with the De Roos family was accomplished via marriage in 1469 and was the way the “Manners 
transformed from remote Northumbrian squires to landed magnates of the north-east midlands”.  See STONE, 
FAMILY AND FORTUNE, supra note 56, 165. However, it is possible that the Eakring estate only came into the 
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Most attractive for our purposes is the fact that in 1604 – the year of the Case – Eakring itself 
was subject to a special survey performed by a gentleman named Henry Caldecott who, with 
the assistance of some tenants of the same manor, drew beautiful plans of the place and its 
surroundings.92 This survey allows us a rare peek at the disputed territory as it looked four 
hundred years ago; but it does much more: it sheds light on the term “Lady Park” as it 
appears in Coke’s report of the Case and it also gives us a serious clue regarding the 
unknown result of this Case.
Let us start from the end: The plans that resulted from this survey do not mention Isabel the 
Countess of Rutland in any way. Instead, at the bottom of the plan that depicts the manor 
itself there appear words of explanation:
hands of the earls of Rutland years later when, in 1539, Gertrud Manners, the eldest daughter of Thomas the 
first Earl of Rutland, married Sir George Talbot of the De Roos family. See text accompanying infra note 97.
92 HENRY CALDECOTT, SURVEY OF THE EAKRING MANOR OF 1604 (Terrier of Eakring with plans, DD.SR 
227/17). The original plans are kept in Nottingham Archives.
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 “The manoure of Eykringe in the Countie of Notinghm being parcel of the 
possessions of the righte honorable Roger Earle of Rutland Lorde of the same 
Manoure. Surveyed the fifte daye of Julye. 1604…”
These words, written in the same year as the judicial decision in our Case, suggest that it was 
Roger who had ultimately won the legal battle as well as the disputed land.93 Further 
evidence for Roger’s victory, albeit less conclusive, is the fact that it was he who sold the 
manor to others.94
93
 Note that the legal basis for such supposed victory is still unknown. The Case ends with guidelines to the jury 
but no one seems to know what happened later. At any rate, what happened later had probably to do more with 
the question of who won the juries sympathy (or who “bought” it) than it had to do with legal arguments. I 
thank Professor Macnair for the last point.
94 ROBERT THOROTON, THE ANTIQUITIES OF NOTTINGHAMSHIRE 198 (John Throsby's edited and enlarged 
edition (1790-6), volume III), (The manor was probably sold to the Marquess of Dorchester).
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Other than “Eykering House”, the manor house referred to in the above quote with its 
associated lands, the dispute in the Case concerned an additional item called the “Lady Park”. 
It is impossible to know why this “Lady Park” warranted special reference in the Case and 
was not simply considered part of the Eykering House, especially since it was close to the 
manor house (or ‘Hall’) itself . 
However, the same survey from 1604 provides us, literally, with a picture of this mysterious 
“object”. This magnificent illustration of the park portrays an enclosed land full of tiny 
sketches of trees (oaks?).
As shown in the plan above the Lady Park was adjacent to what is titled in the plan as 
“Eykringe pasture leyes” and lay just over a mile from the manor itself. At the lower right-
hand corner of the plan an economic analysis is offered (reprinted here with no change of 
spelling):
34
“The Ladie parke is a woodgrounde, and the wooddes therin are lately solde, sothat 
little profitte is to be made thereof by woodsales for manye yeres. Therfore in my 
opinion it were good to stubbe the moste p[ar]te thereof & convert it to pasture. So 
that thereby present profitte maye be made, And the rather for that it is to be kepte 
enclosed continuallye.”
The information provided by this text gives us reason to suspect that due to the sale of all its 
wood, the Lady Park’s value decreased significantly during the years between the making of 
the indentures and the legal debate regarding their meaning.
Having understood what the “park” was, we now turn to the “lady” that gave it its name. One 
of the most appealing and symbolic possible explanations is that Isabel was not the first wife 
to receive this land from her husband and that the park was given to one of the Ladies in past 
generations as a morning gift, a gift given to the bride by her newly wedded husband in 
exchange for her loss of virginity upon the consummation of their marriage.95 One possibility 
may be that this part of the estate was given to Gertrud Manners upon her marriage to George 
Talbot in 1539.96 Support for this may be found in an indenture made by Gertrude’s father, 
Thomas the 1st Earl of Rutland:
“’An Indenture between Francis Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury and Thomas Manners, 
Earl of Rutland, whereby the former leaves to his son George, Lord Talbot, on his 
marriage with Gertrude, daughter of the latter, the Manor of Rufford, the Lordship of 
Ekeryng, with lands in Rufford, Ekeryng and Kirketon. Co.Nottingham.”97
95
 Correspondence (December 30th 2003) with Mr. Derek Walker, Chairman of the Nottinghamshire Local 
History Association at the time.
96
 See supra note 91.
97
 Correspondence (March 5th 2004) with Mr. Derek Walker, Chairman of the Nottinghamshire Local History 
Association at the time. The indenture is dated 32 Hy.VIII (the 32nd year of King Henry’s reign, i.e. 1540/1541). 
The original document is kept in the Nottinghamshire Archives Office as a Savile of Rufford deposit: DD.DR 
207/338.
35
Another charming possible explanation for the “lady” in “Lady Park” concerns female deer 
hunters.  It seems that the term ‘Lady Park’ did not appear until Elizabethan times and may 
have referred to the Queen herself. It was accepted that the monarch, invariably a man up 
until the time of her sister Mary and Elizabeth herself, took part in the exercise of hunting 
and particularly in the hunting of deer. But this was a very physical activity for which a 
woman was not considered suited, and so the Lady Park developed whereby Elizabeth – and 
her ladies – would sit in carriages and the deer would be driven past them, allowing the ladies 
comfortable aim. This became fashionable in Elizabethan times, which could explain why the 
name does not appear earlier in Eakring. The Eakring Park was quite small and perhaps 
particularly suitable for this type of hunting. Taking all this into account, it is probable that 
Isabel hunted in this style in the Rutlands’ Lady Park at Eakring.98
On a more general note, it is interesting that the findings of the 1604 survey seem to indicate 
that the overall size of the Eykering House together with its surrounding lands was 1015 
acres (including land held by tenants), a relatively modest estate in view of the Rutlands’ vast 
possessions at the time.
2.  The Minor Characters
a. Lord Burghley
Lord Burghley appears in our story explicitly in the second written indenture, where Edward 
names him, among others, as responsible for the transference of a long list of properties to his 
male heirs. Indirectly, as we have already seen, Lord Burghley was heavily involved with the 
Manners in many ways and hence it seems worthwhile to try and learn more about him. He 
was born in 1520 as William Cecil and was highly educated in what was at that time the best 
98
 Correspondence (March 25th 2004) with Mr. Derek Walker, Chairman of the Nottinghamshire Local History 
Association at the time.
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college in England: St. John’s College in Cambridge. Curiously, in a way that might remind 
us of Edward Manners’ marriage to Isabel, he married against his father’s will a woman of 
“slender means”99 after the failure of his ambitious father’s plan to prevent this by moving 
him to another university. 
Cecil would be one of Queen Elizabeth’s chief advisors for decades. Upon her accession to 
the throne she immediately made him the Secretary of State – a position he held until 1572, 
whereupon he was made the Lord Treasurer until his death in 1598.  Despite the fact that 
Elizabeth was not generous in creating new peerages,100 she raised her loyal advisor to the 
peerage in 1571 giving him the title of Lord Burghley - a decision that reflects well the 
power he gained in the days of the Elizabeth’s reign. Lord Burghley is often described as the 
most influential man in the Elizabethan era.101 In the context of our story it may be 
enormously important in understanding the audacity and impact of Edeward’s decision to 
refuse to marry this dominant man’s daughter, as well as the extraordinaryand to the high 
value of the eventual marriage of Edward’s daughter to Burghley’s grandson.102
b. Gilbert Gerard
Sir Gilbert Gerard’s name appears on both of the contradictory indentures, a peculiarity that 
did not escape Coke’s attention.103 It is important, thus, to explore Gerard’s connection to the 
Manners and the legal skills he brought to his responsibilities under these documents. In this 
99 DNB, supra note 53, Vol. III, at 1315.
100
 There were only fifteen new creations in her 44 years of reign.
101
 See, for instance, ANNE SOMERSET, ELIZABETH I (1991) at 63-64, 279, 501, 505-506 and in general CONYERS 
READ, LORD BURGHLEY AND QUEEN ELIZABETH (1960).
102
 See supra note 67.
103
 In an edition of Coke’s Reports from 1826 a remark by Coke is printed next to one of the appearances of 
Gilbert’s name saying: “note, Sir Gilb. was party to both the indentures.” THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, 
KNT. [1572-1617] IN THIRTEEN PARTS (London: J. Butterworth and Son; etc., 1826). This rare edition is kept in 
the Robbins Collection of the Law library of University of California, Berkeley. The Case is included in a 
chapter titled “Cases of Covenants, Agreements &c. concerning Leases Assurances &c.”
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regard it is significant to learn that Gilbert Gerard and Isabel were first-cousins: his mother, 
Margaret Holcroft, was the sister of Isabel’s father. In addition, his co-trustee to the first 
indenture was Thomas Holcroft, Isabel’s brother, who is mentioned in our Case as Edward’s 
“brother” for being his brother in-law. 
Furthermore, Gerard had a fine legal education in Gray’s Inn and his legal reputation was so 
exceptional that Elizabeth nominated him to the influential position of Attorney-General 
soon after her accession.104 Thirty seven years later she would nominate Coke, the reporter of 
our Case, to the same influential position.105 In 1581 Gerard climbed another step up the 
legal ladder of the times and was appointed Master of the Rolls – an office he held until his 
death in 1593.
3. Wrapping-up the Thicker Story: the Outlawing of Context
The thicker story I have tried to sketch above adds some context to the slim text of the report 
of the Countess of Rutland’s Case, a context so absent from Coke’s description. Going back 
to the central question of the two conflicting indentures made by Edward Manners, it now 
seems more evident that the context of the Case could loudly speak for the first indenture, 
which promised the land to Isabel. The indications are numerous and I will only point out a 
few: Edward, a very talented and experienced legal professional, took the legal effort of 
making a specific indenture that was dedicated to Eykering – one relatively small and 
marginal property among the many assets of the prosperous Manners family. For the 
purposes of this indenture he particularly chose respected trustees from his wife’s family and 
104
 According to the DNB “he thus never took the degree of sergeant-at-law” DNB, supra note 53 , at 1097.
105
 The achievement of becoming an Attorney-General was described by one of Coke’s best friends in these 
words: “This office is one of the greatest, and largest, concerning the possessions of the Crown, an 
extraordinary place for the preservation of the King’s royal prerogatives, and inheritances, so that by this 
diligent care, he may increase them, and by the neglect of his duty, he may more diminish them’ than any of his 
Majesty’s ministerial office.” BOYER, supra note 78,at 253.
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entrusted them to make sure that his beloved wife, for whom he was willing to risk so much 
during his lifetime, should have an adequate jointure for her widowhood. He did so knowing 
that he had no son and that his wife would therefore most likely be dependant upon the 
mercy of his male heirs. He calculated that these heirs could not be trusted to care enough for 
his wife’s welfare, not only because the responsibility for jointures was viewed in those times 
as an economic disaster, but also because of his heirs antagonism towards Isabel because of 
her inability to contribute to the family’s fortunes upon their marriage. The choice of 
Eykering of all the family’s properties can be seen as a conscious decision on Edward’s part 
– Eykering being a not-too-important asset, but still one that could provide a decent income 
for his widow, for instance, thorough the sale of wood from the Lady Park and the collection 
of rent from tenants. 
We can not be sure, of course, but it well may be that the fact that Edward included the same 
property of Eykering House and the Lady Park in the two different – and conflicting –
documents was simply a mistake on his part. In light of Edward’s vast legal and business 
talents, such an error seems more plausible than the possibility that he consciously created 
conflicting indentures. All of the above circumstances would seem to support the supposition 
that he never meant to include this special property in the later and much more general 
document.
In this same context, we can also find support for the possibility that Roger’s fight over 
Eykering did not necessarily arise from any solid belief in his legal right but from a desperate 
economic situation and an urgent need to get rid of an excessive burden of jointures.106 Given 
all the indications as to Roger’s general irresponsibility, it does not seem implausible to 
106
 For support of this argument see Crosswhite, supra note 54, at 1138.
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assume that his “breaking” to Isabel’s house was a hasty attempt to deal with his financial 
crisis by making use of the presumed weakness of his widowed rival.
The gap between the story that Coke told us and the thicker version of the story as presented 
here is remarkable. This gap emphasizes the terse nature of the legal report and suggests that 
its slimness was intentional. A possible response could point to the general manner in which 
law reports were written in Coke’s times.107 This kind of response would, of course, explain 
the fact that Coke’s text is indeed oblivious of its context. But, as I will now argue, Coke’s 
text does not only refrain from the context but it also consciously and bluntly resists it. 
Coke’s text could and indeed should be read as a text about texts: their importance, their 
supremacy and their desired reign. Of the two reporters of the Case it was only Coke who 
reported Judge Popham to say:
“Also it would be inconvenient, that matters in writing made by advice and on 
consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of the 
parties should be controlled by averment of the parties to be proved by the uncertain 
testimony of slippery memory.”108
These words reflect much more than a pro-textual approach and upon close reading their 
anti-contextual attitude is evident. The alternative to the written text is the unreliable 
“slippery memory” of witnesses, and an apocalyptic warning follows:
“And it would be dangerous to purchasers and farmers, and all other in such cases, if 
such nude averments against matter in writing should be admitted.”109
107 Especially since, as mentioned before, Coke’s text is the more elaborate. See text accompanying supra notes 
44 and 45 . 
108
 Coke’s report, supra note 44, at 90. 
109 Id.
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From this choice of strong words such as “dangerous” and “nude” it seems that the author’s 
purpose is to elevate the text to sanctity and to eliminate entirely any other contradictory 
information. We can grasp the deliberate effort made here to outlaw context if we remind 
ourselves of the facts of the Case, which involved two incompatible documents and not a
clash between a written text and competing (risky) testimony. 
One immediate lesson that can be learned from the thicker version of the story, the one that 
includes context, is that at the beginning of the seventeenth century the act of establishing a 
legal rule that crowned text and expelled context was a truly hegemonic act. Back then the 
contractual text was totally inaccessible to women,110 and it was only the wider context that 
had the potential to disclose their gendered reality and inferiority. Concerning the availability 
of the texts of contracts to women in those days, several points are worth mentioning: First, 
women were in general far less literate and educated than men. Second, women’s literacy 
was confined for the most part to the well-to-do women, and those who were lucky enough to 
be able to read were usually directed to readings of “female-literature” such as romances, 
plays and poetry.111 Third, needless to say there was no way an early-modern Englishwoman 
could earn the legal education that would enable her to comprehend, let alone write, a 
contract. And fourth, once married a woman could not even be a passive side to a contract, 
for instance by signing it without reading it, since according to the rule of coverture she had 
no legal entity of her own.112
This last point brings us directly to the gendered impact of rejecting context. Not only 
insignificant details were left out by focusing only on the text. Rather, as Isabel’s Case
110
 Of course some (but not all) of the limitations were also a product of low socio-economic background and 
not only gender.
111 STONE, SEX & MARRIAGE, supra note 58, at 143. 
112
 Id. at 136.
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beautifully demonstrates, it was for the most part the patriarchal nature of the story that was 
excluded: Isabel’s inability, as any other married woman’s inability, to hold or control 
personal property, necessitating third-party contractual arrangements; the difficulty in 
enforcing these arrangements and fulfilling the intent of a husband who sought to bypass 
patriarchal inheritance rules in order to secure the future of his wife; the strong resistance to 
brides who could not bring along hefty dowries; and finally, the need to fight for jointure 
lands against powerful male heirs of the patriline. Hence, shaping a rule that decidedly gives 
the text ultimate control over the interpretation of the contract/s at issue had, even if 
unknowingly, a strong patriarchal meaning.
To get a better sense of this patriarchal nature of the Case we can attempt to track Isabel’s 
voice. She is first silenced due to her absence from the contractual text as a result of her 
marriage and her mergence into her husband’s person. She then gains a distinct voice as a 
plaintiff through her new status as a widow, that allows her to appear in court and, as a result, 
in the report’s text. But still, her voice could not be heard since the English seventeenth 
century law of evidence excluded the parties themselves from the witness stand.113 Instead, 
others, namely the “diverse witnesses”,114 speak for her and they represent her voice as 
coming from outside the text. And here is the catch: their voices, which are a poor variation 
of hers, are ridiculed as the unbelievable result of their “slippery memory”.
From a contemporary perspective the above analysis may produce two chief conclusions 
regarding the nature of the parol evidence rule. On the one hand, we see how the rule was 
“born in sin”, as Coke’s text about the supremacy of contractual texts did indeed create a 
chauvinistic act. On the other hand the historical reality that made the rule so female-
113 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 348-349 (fourth edition, 2002).
114
 Coke’s report, supra note 44, at 89-90 (“…it was proved by diverse witnesses that the said Earl 
Edward…told them, that the said countess should have the manor…”).
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excluding to begin with has so changed by the beginning of the twenty-first century that one 
might argue that what was born in sin is now purified and hence sustainable. But is it?115 To 
address this question I feel I should go smaller116 again: to the details of the text that 
supposedly constituted the parol evidence rule and then to the specifics of its creation.
III. CLOSE READING OF THE TEXT
One specific paragraph of Coke’s report has been quoted repeatedly through the centuries 
and indeed has been seen as constituting the modern parol evidence rule. As these words 
have remained influential long after  the litigation that led to their writing was forgotten, it is 
important to look at them more closely:
“…it would be inconvenient that matters in writing made by advice and on 
consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of the 
parties should be controlled by averment of the parties to be proved by the uncertain 
testimony of slippery memory. And, it would be dangerous to purchasers and farmers, 
and all other in such cases, if such nude averments against matter in writing should be 
admitted.”117
Several characteristics of the newborn rule are evident even from its wording alone: its 
aspiration to separation, its hierarchical nature, its alleged rationality, its claim to certainty 
and its pro-market orientation. Together, as I will now further explore, these characteristics 
115
 For negative answers from feminist perspectives see PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND 
RIGHTS (1991) 106; Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. Revisited: The Ballad of Willie 
and Lucille, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1341, 1412-1416 (1995). However, these responses are based on the current 
American form of the Parol Evidence Rule where as mine concentrates on exposing its older English roots.
116
 Here I am inspired by Prof. Mariana Valverde’s approach. MARIANA VALVERDE, LAW'S DREAM OF A 
COMMON KNOWLEDGE (2003).
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 Coke’s report, supra note 44, at 90.
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portray a highly masculine profile, based upon common stereotypes of men, while alienating 
traits which are usually (and, again, stereotypically) associated with femininity.118
A. An Aspiration to Separation
By separation I mean the assumption that the written text of the contract can and should be 
separated from all that surrounds it. The above quote from our Case divides the world into 
two groups: the first is “matters in writing” – a phrase which appears twice in this short 
paragraph – and the second group – also appearing twice – is that of “averments”. It is easy 
to see what “matters in writing” are, given the very tangible nature of the written words; it is 
much more difficult to grasp what stands against it, under the title “averments”. Literally the 
last term refers to the action of proving the truth, and etymologically it comes from Latin 
(adv r re) and French (avérer), which emphasize the same search for the truth.119 Legally 
the term was reserved for a formal offer to prove a line of facts, to verify what was pleaded.
Confronting “matters of writing” with “averments” suggests that the two groups are indeed 
separable: there are indisputable facts that are part of the written text and there are other 
alleged facts that need to go through the process of averment; there are “solid” facts that are 
included in a “matter in writing” and there are “fluid” facts that exist in the “slippery 
memory” of the witnesses. Since the rule quoted above bans the second type of facts, the 
fluid facts, it seems that a separation between the solid and the fluid is inherent to it and 
defines its very essence. 
But, the separation is not that simple. Just consider, for instance, the fact that the trustees of 
the first indenture were Gilbert Gerard and Thomas Holcroft. Since these names were written 
118 By highlighting the correlation between the words used to phrase the parol evidence rule and gender 
stereotypes, I do not in any way mean to imply that such stereotypes are representative of a true essence of 
either gender or should be sustained. On the contrary, in doing so I hope to expose more of the rule’s biased 
nature.
119
 OED, supra note 62.
44
in the indenture itself, they can be seen as “solid” facts that come from a “matter in writing”. 
But what about the family ties of these two trustees to Isabel the Countess of Rutland? As we 
saw earlier they were her relatives, obviously a fact that might support her claims. But what 
kind of fact is that? Fluid? Solid? On the one hand, the family ties are not part of the written 
text, but on the other hand the name Thomas Holcroft is written and might be connected 
easily to the Countess’ maiden name, which is not written. Are we facing an averment which 
is going to be rejected under the new rule or are we in the realm of “in writing”? Or perhaps 
Holcroft’s connection is part of the written text while Gerard’s ties are only a fluid fact?
The same question arises regarding the “Lady Park”. The name of that property was almost 
certainly written on the first indenture, but its use as a hunting place for ladies probably was 
not mentioned. Is it enough that the word “lady” was written to make its special meaning a 
matter in writing – or is this contextual information too fluid and therefore in need of
averment? As these brief examples illustrate, the division at stake is not that natural and is 
more a result of a conscious and somewhat arbitrary effort. 
The ability to separate “matters in writing” from other facts that require averment stands at 
the base of a rule that suggests forbidding such averment. Still, it is worth noticing that it also 
works the other way around: a legal system which adopts such a rule is aspiring to separation 
and thus declaring its strong belief in the positive value of separation. 
A closer look at the tendency to separate things and to divide them into disconnected groups 
might expose a gendered facet of the rule.120 The general argument is that the very attempt to 
draw strict borderlines and build high walls between concepts correlates with masculine 
120
 Note that this is a contemporary look. It is based on the assumption that even if the early-modern reality has 
changed in a manner that makes the contractual text accessible to women, still the rule that prefers the text can 
harm women due to its masculine nature. 
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stereotypes. Such attempt is based upon a belief that the ability to separate one thing from 
another is a human achievement and a sign of development. A further underlying belief is 
that through acts of disconnection we will find ways to better control our lives, by organizing 
them in neat and independent categories.
Fundamental ideas that shape western culture support and reinforce the linkage between 
maleness and the capability of creating a separation.  One legendary instance is Sigmund 
Freud’s theory concerning the stages of development of the human personality. According to 
this theory boys deal with their Oedipal complex by separation: the boy represses his 
libidinal impulses toward the mother and detaches himself from her. Freud draws a 
connection between this crucial separation and the boy’s competence to develop his super-
ego. Problematically, but nevertheless with enormous influence on our culture, he then goes 
on to claim that boys enjoy a moral superiority over girls who remain entangled in their own 
Electra complex without a similar separation ability that would enable them to resolve it.121
In contrast to this masculine image, women are not identified with the trait of separation. 
From cultural feminism we have learned that women do not perceive themselves, their tasks 
or their experiences as isolated units. Motherhood, as a leading example, pushes women to 
do just the opposite – to combine – and not to separate – their spheres of involvement: career,
parenthood, and so forth.122 Radical feminism is known to respond sharply to this argument, 
and maintains that such description of women is not their nature, but rather a symptom of 
121
 Naturally, this last part of the theory - the equation of separation and development - has attracted a great deal 
of feminist criticism.  It is important to mention that a strong argument - which supports the feminist criticism -
has recently been made from a masculine perspective. The claim is that the separation and disconnection model 
not only deprives women but hurts men as well. For example, in his first book psychotherapist Terrence Real 
claims that the separation process does not advance men or symbolize their development, but is rather a social 
dictate imposed on men, one which exacts a heavy toll and leads to male depression. See TERRENCE REAL, I 
DON’T WANT TO TALK ABOUT IT (1998).
122 Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1998). On the reality of such efforts to 
combine see e.g., Jacquelyn H. Slotkin, Should I Have Learned to Cook? Interviews with Women Lawyers 
Juggling Multiple Roles, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 147 (2002).
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their weakness and inferiority: male power perpetuates its control over women, among other 
methods, by describing them as incapable of the correct and admired way of thinking – that 
is, thinking that distinguishes and separates.123 However, despite this disagreement the 
feminisms are united in their objection to the idea that separation is attainable and valuable. 
Applying this critique to the separation at hand, as done under the parol evidence rule, it can 
be argued that the attempt to distance text from context and “matters in writing” from 
“averments” presents a masculine model. Dealing with the messy information that might 
shed light on the contract’s interpretation by arbitrary categorization of its pieces is not 
necessarily a sign of intellectual or moral development. Indeed, it is an indication that the 
chosen model suffers from a lack of feminine qualities.
B. A Hierarchical Nature
The dichotomies of text/context or “matters in writing”/”averments” entail not only a dubious 
separation but also an evident hierarchy. The written text is placed high above the “other” 
pieces of information. Such positioning is made clear by the text quoted earlier in two ways: 
by praising the superior term and by condemning its lower counterpart.
As to the praise, the text symbolizes clearly which of the dichotomized possibilities we 
should trust. The most conspicuous signifier is the association of the “matter of writing” with 
the word “truth” - and not just with a simple truth but with a “certain” one. Indeed the 
uplifting label of “certain truth” is so powerful that it is almost unnecessary to look for other 
signifiers. However, the characterization of writing as “made by advice and on 
consideration” powerfully suggests how thoughtful the process of writing is and hence how 
clever is its result. 
123 See e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED 32 (1987).
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The element of condemnation of “averments” involves several signifiers. The first is quite 
hidden and might work unconsciously – the inferior end of the hierarchy does not even have 
a name. As we saw earlier, the term “averments” covers something ambiguous defined only 
as the negation of what was put in writing, something still waiting to be proved. The lack of a 
name is meaningful when the question of dependability is at stake – how can one trust that 
which has no name? The namelessness is a representation of nonexistence and it directly 
leads to the desired conclusion, i.e. that these “averments” should be ignored. 
Second, the text seems to verify our understanding of the hierarchy by using derogating 
signifiers as well. In contrast to the “certain truth” which produces the “matters of writing”, 
the averments are “uncertain” since they result from uncertain testimony. 
Even though this would be more than enough to clarify the order of things to the reader, the 
text provides a third indication by stressing that the uncertainty derives from “slippery 
memory” – a disparaging term particularly in the context of the comparison with “matter of 
writing”; in Coke’s “lexicon”, as well as in others’ texts, “slippery memory” was frequently 
used as an antonym of fine legal writing and indeed as a means for advocating writing as 
well as printing and publishing.124
The fourth “hint” regarding the bottom of the hierarchy emerges from the use of the word 
“nude” to describe the averments. In legal archaic language “nude” meant unattested, 
unconfirmed, unproved.125 In a narrower contractual context it bore the even worse meaning 
124 RICHARD HELGERSON, FORMS OF NATIONHOOD: THE ELIZABETHAN WRITING OF ENGLAND 81 (1992); 
Richard J. Ross, The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers: Memory as Keyword, Shelter, and 
Identity, 1560-1640 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 229, 273, 305, 326 (1998). In another case reported by Coke he 
used an expression which was even more clearly negative saying: “therefore the intention of the parties never 
was to leave it to the sliding and slippery memory of men, which would be lost in a short time…” See 
Dowman’s Case 9 COKE REPORT 7b, 77 ER 473 (emphasis added).
125
 OED, supra note 62.
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of being void due to lack of consideration unless made by written deed.126  In any case, to say 
that the averments are “nude” clearly adds to their characterization as undependable. 
And finally, the vertical view of the relationship between the written and the unrecorded is 
further strengthened by the less general words that precede the words that are quoted here, 
words which clearly portray a ladder:
“…if other agreement… be made by writing, or by other matter as high or higher, 
then the last agreement shall stand; for every contract or agreement ought to be 
dissolved by matter of as high a nature as the first deed.”127
That a hierarchical rule is of a hegemonic nature needs little elaboration. As many feminists, 
from different strands of feminism, have claimed before – women tend to be the systematic 
victims of hierarchal thinking and are usually associated with the lower end of each 
fundamental dichotomy that constitutes the western culture. In leading dichotomies such as 
normal/strange, subject/object, main/marginal, active/passive, culture/nature, 
rational/emotional, strong/weak, public/private, autonomous/dependant, and so on, the 
female stereotype is echoed by the second, less appreciated side of each pair.128 Whenever a 
dichotomous separation is defined, the human instinct responds with vertical arrangement of 
its parts. Furthermore, many times creating such a vertical arrangement and defining the 
supremacy of one of the items in each pair is indeed the initial motivation for distinguishing 
the favorite item from its surroundings to begin with. Applying this analysis to the dichotomy 
at hand, we can instantly observe the phenomenon in action in Coke’s text: in the 
dichotomies of certain/uncertain, truthful/deceitful, solid/fluid, written/oral and covered/nude 
– as in the many other dichotomies mentioned before – the female stereotype correlates with 
the second item in each pair, the less valued, the less trustworthy.  
126 Id.
127
 Coke’s report, supra note 44, at 90.
128HILAIRE BARNETT, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 201 (1998).
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C. An Alleged Rationality
What did Coke mean when he wrote that it would be inconvenient to let matters in writing be 
controlled by averment? To address this question it is important to realize how frequent and 
intentional the legal use of this word was.129 Coke used inconvenient to mean inconsistent130
and preached for a consistent rule of law, a rule that adheres to its internal logic. Ideally such 
a rule would be based upon general reason, would offer a broad solution which could apply 
to most cases, and would better serve the public interest. The use of inconvenient thus
represented flinching from reasonableness. It also worked the other way around to signify 
that avoiding such inconvenience would lead to a continuous possession of reason as well as 
to its preservation. In a world which defines rationality as the “the quality of possessing a 
reason; the power of being able to exercise one’s reason” staying away from the inconvenient 
meant just that – appearing to uphold rationality.131
That Coke was aware of the risk to concrete justice that is involved in such an approach is 
quite clear. His response was that it is better “that a private person should be punished or 
damnified by the rigor of the law, than a general rule of the law should be broken…”132 The 
use of inconvenient thus represented a fairly rigid devotion to abstract rationality at the 
conscious expense of individuals’ concerns. 
To say that it would be inconvenient to let the messy reality influence the interpretation of a 
written contract is, in fact, to say that dedication to the written is logical and rational. This 
129 The term was quite common but no other reporter of the time seemed to use it more than Coke who –
according to the English Reports online at www.jutastat.com – used it 42(!) times throughout his 13 volumes of 
reports.
130
 Decoding “inconvenient” also involves coping with either Latin or Law-French. See supra note 46 and the 
text next to infra note 194. See also Allan D. Boyer, Understanding, Authority and Will: Sir Edward Coke and 
the Elizabethan Origins of Judicial Review 39 B.C.L. REV. 43, 72 (1997) ("Coke continued: "Nihil quod est 
inconveniens, est licitum. And the law, that is the perfection of reason, cannot suffer anything that is 
inconvenient.").
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 The quote is taken from the OED, supra note 62. 
132 BOYER, supra note 78, at 72 (quoting Coke’s words from 1635 in his A LITTLE TREATISE OF BAILE AND 
MAINPRIZE). 29-30
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raises a gender issue that has been addressed in numerous feminist works. In a nutshell, such 
a critique denounces the logo-centricity of law and its artificial mask of rationality. From a 
feminist perspective these traits tend to silence and frustrate many women by denying the 
value of other means of expression and other sources of knowledge which are not a product 
of lingual analysis. 
Even at the lingual level the search for the antonym of “rational” is a telling one. Apart from 
the obvious “irrational”, such a search would produce words such as: illogical, unreasonable, 
foolish, crazy, ridiculous, absurd, silly, unfounded, groundless and so forth. Evidently those 
are all disapproving ways of describing what is not rational. However, studies have suggested 
that “not-rational” ways of communication are an integral part of women’s lives, as women 
are more sensitive to non-lingual symbols such as body language, tone of voice or facial 
expression, and indeed tend to use such symbols much more than men.133 While one might
resist the essentialist flavor of these findings, as I do, if only because there can not be one 
“women’s way of thinking”, there is still a disturbing point that is worth making here. To 
reject proof of unwritten facts as “inconvenient” and irrational means to discard what is 
perceived as “feminine” knowledge together with ways of communication that are more 
associated with women.134 It is almost needless to note that this was an especially biased 
move in early-modern times when the official way of performing rationality, i.e. legal 
writing, was not even an available option for women. Critiques of this kind challenge the 
dominance of rationality in the legal discourse and call to open legal space for extra-rational 
133 See, e.g., JANET S. HYDE, HALF THE HUMAN EXPERIENCE 112-121 (fifth edition, 1996). To use only one 
legal example it seems that female lawyers and clients use emotional verbs a lot more than their male lawyer 
and client counterparts. Peggy Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A Demonstration Exploring Hierarchy and 
‘Feminine’ Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1635, 1660 (1991).
134 See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 971, 976 (1991) (“many feminist 
narratives contain an epistemological claim. The "scientific rationality" that prevails in our society -- and in our 
legal argumentation -- privileges universality, statistical significance, and logical deduction as ways of knowing 
about the world. Experiential narratives are significant not only for the substantive message they convey but for 
the way they claim to know what they know. Feminist narratives present experience as a way of knowing that 
should occupy a respected, or in some cases a privileged position, in analysis and argumentation”). 
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knowledge.135 It seems to me that it is exactly the creation of such a space that was prevented 
so effectively back in 1604 by the formation of a contractual parol evidence rule. 
D. A Search for Certainty
One reason why adhering to the written is considered rational (“convenient”) is that it entails 
or even promotes certainty.136 According to our quoted text, the written document carries the 
“certain truth” while the averments are made of “uncertain testimony”. Positioning “certain 
truth” against “uncertain testimony” not only suggests the preference for what is written, to 
which we referred in the earlier discussion of “hierarchy”, but can be seen as a representation 
of the certain as well as a barrier against the deceitful nature of uncertainty. The question 
would then be – is this really the case? Assuming certainty is achievable, which is doubtful, 
is it necessarily better? Is it in fact truthful?
From a feminist perspective, as well as from a post-modern viewpoint, the answer seems 
quite negative. To assume that certainty is so desirable means to believe that we should 
struggle to maintain the status-quo. But who is most interested in maintaining the status-quo 
if not the powerful who are best served by it and feel comfortable with it? For the weaker 
members of a given society, those who yearn for change, it is the status-quo that prevents 
hope. For such members their inferiority is certain and the uncertain transformation is what 
they dream of. 
Certainty, in other words, is valuable for some but not for all. It is valuable not necessarily 
because of its “truthful” nature but because of the service it provides for the “haves” at the 
135 See, e.g., Paul J. Spiegelman, Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice In the Law School Curriculum: The 
Logic of Jack’s Ladder in the Context of Amy’s Web, 38 J. LEGAL EDU. 243, 254-255 (1988); Kate Green, Being 
here: What a Woman Can Say about Land Law, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOUNDATIONAL SUBJECTS 
OF LAW 87, 102 (Anne Bottomley ed., 1996) (“Law comes from the whole of human life, not only from the 
disembodied intellect.”).  
136
 And indeed this logic is emphasized through quoting the Case until nowadays. See, for example, the BCCI 
decision, supra note 41, in section 54. Compare to Peter Linzer, The Comfort of Certainty: Plain Meaning and 
the Parol Evidence Rule, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 799 (2002).
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expense of the “have-nots”. As a representation of a concrete interest, certainty is not The
truth but rather a partial version of truth, namely the part that was well documented in legal 
written terms. From the standpoint of those with no access to the written text there is nothing 
attractive about the “certainty” that is gained from adopting it. The tone that praises certainty 
is, thus, quite masculine - it holds no acknowledgement of doubt or equivocation and it does 
not reflect what the English poet Keats termed “Negative Capability”: the capacity to remain
in situations of uncertainty, mystery and doubt.137
Support for this may come by deconstructing the juxtaposition of writing to averments. When 
Coke’s text links writing with certain truth and averments with uncertain testimonies (lies) as 
a reason for preferring the written, we could try a “Derrida-like” reversal.138 We could 
consider the possibility that the virtue of the certain could be seen as the virtue of the 
uncertain and vice versa. What this “upside-down” view can expose is that the certain is no 
more truthful than the uncertain, indeed if anything it has the potential of being more 
misleading. As a written artifact the certain is usually more tangible than any other source of 
information, but it is exactly its “black and white” nature which allows manipulative 
planning through editing and revising. The human control of the written distances it from the 
authentic happening until it can no longer represent a truth, let alone a certain truth. Indeed, 
the very technique of law reporting in which Coke was engaged while creating the dichotomy 
137
 Frug, supra note 13, 117-119. The analysis focused on Prof. Posner’s tone in a piece of his own which 
praised certainty. 
138
 The most famous example of this technique is Derrida's Of Grammatology where interestingly enough he 
treats the opposition of speech to writing (arguing that the western modern culture prefers the former and not 
the latter). See JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1976), (Gayatri Spivak, trans. 1997). As Balkin has 
concisely explained: “Deconstructive reversals show that the reasons given for privileging one side of an 
opposition over the other often turn out to be reasons for privileging the other side. The virtues of the first term 
are seen to be the virtues of the second; the vices of the second are revealed to be true of the first as well. This 
undoing of justifications for privileging is part of the deconstructionist aim of "ungrounding" preferred 
conceptions by showing that they cannot act as self-sufficient or self-explanatory grounds or foundations.” J. M. 
Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L. J. 743, 755 (1987).
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of certain/uncertain confirms this post-modern view: the written report was not the truth but 
the uncertain version of the truth, a late interpretation of a specific reporter, and as I will try 
to show later on, one which was heavily dependent on and reflective of the reporter’s 
personal views and agenda. 
To sum up, it seems essential to view the quest for certainty with suspicion; as reflecting  
hegemonic motives in portraying as universally beneficial something that actually benefits 
only a few. The question of who these favored few are and what gender they belong to will 
now conclude this section. 
E. Pro- market Orientation
Coke’s much quoted text warned that “it would be dangerous to purchasers and farmers” to 
admit nude averments.139 The word “purchasers” probably referred to people who acquire 
land or property in any way other than by inheritance, while “farmers” were most likely those 
who rent or have a lease of such property.140 Since neither purchasers nor farmers were 
directly involved in this specific case it seems that the use of these words was more 
metaphoric, reflective of a greater concern.141  What was the danger that Coke had in mind? 
Who or what was he trying to defend? 
The authentic answer to these questions may not be clear, but it appears that Coke was 
making a policy point: things will work better if we adhere to written words and not let them 
be subverted by other pieces of knowledge. Exactly which things will work better is 
answered by the formula of “purchasers and farmers” – and indeed it seems that their 
139
 For other reports in which Coke used those words see Dillon v Freine 1 COKE REPORT 120a, 76 ER 270; 
Smith v Mills 2 COKE REPORT 25a, 76 ER 441; Green v Balser 2 COKE REPORT 46a, 76 ER 519; Mildmay's 
Case 6 COKE REPORT 40a, 77 ER 311; Burrel's Case 6 COKE REPORT 72a, 77 ER 364.
140
 OED, supra note 62.
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 Note that the Countess of Rutland herself might be considered as a potential purchaser but from her point of 
view there was certainly no danger at all in admitting averments, to the contrary: she was the one who was 
offering these averments.
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concerns and businesses were Coke’s focal point. Plainly he was not interested in the way 
noblemen or their heirs received their property due to their status, but rather in those who 
used contract for exchanging property. Whilst society as a whole was perhaps taking the first 
steps of what Maine would much later describe as a long journey from status to contract,142
Coke seemed interested in the contractual tool itself, the one used by purchasers and farmers. 
The danger he visualized was in all likelihood the danger of chaos, of never-ending clashes 
and contradictions between the written contracts and the oral promises, between the legal 
texts and the human contexts that threaten to change their meaning. To enable commercial 
activity, to let purchasers and farmers bargain, it must have been seen as crucial to have law 
and order, law that maintains the order, law that embraces the written and knowingly chooses 
to ignore the surrounding circumstances. This last point is strongly connected to the value of 
certainty that was just discussed and it suggests that the first version of the parol evidence 
rule should be seen as a “pro-market” act, one that aspires to advance the embryonic market 
and to facilitate its operation.143
The view that this was a period of critical transformation from a feudal regime to a more 
contractual economy has been argued and contested at length and needs little exploration 
here.144 What is important to realize is that gender-wise such commercial motives as 
142 SIR HENRY SUMMER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND 
ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS (1861).
143The term “market” should be read with caution as it is extremely doubtful that a “market” in the sense we 
know today was even beginning to rise. What I mean by “market” simply refers to “business-like” activity 
which is executed by contracts. 
144 LAWRENCE STONE, THE CRISIS OF THE ARISTOCRACY 1558-1641 (1965); KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT 
TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME; A.W.B. Simpson, Land Ownership 
and Economic Freedom, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 13-43, 23 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998); 
ANDREW MCRAE, GOD SPEED THE PLOUGH: THE REPRESENTATION OF AGRARIAN ENGLAND 1500-1660 14 
(1996). (“The great sales of church lands in the middle of the 16th century had begun the creation of a market in 
real property and the opening of new positions in the Tudor bureaucracy to those without land had created a 
new group of buyers, expanding the landed class”); Hill, supra note 64, at 102 (“in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries, as agriculture was being commercialized, so the Common Law was being adapted to the 
needs of capitalist society and the protection of property.”); To a suggestion that this emerging contractual focus 
was occupying the dramatic imagination of the period see LUKE WILSON, THEATERS OF INTENTION: DRAMA 
AND LAW IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 70-71 (2000).
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represented in the text by the terms “purchasers” and “farmers” are, again, truly and highly 
problematic. The placement of women outside the admirable spheres of 
commerce/business/market and within inferior realms, namely the domestic spaces, is a 
phenomenon that has been explored by a number of scholars, in varied contexts.145 Yet, it is 
worth repeating the point: purchasers and farmers, who contracted at the core of what was 
then “the market”, might have been better off relying on the written words which they could 
most probably write and control. Women at the time were most likely not better off. For 
them, as the Countess of Rutland’s Case neatly demonstrates, the chances to find the right 
interpretation of the contract within the four corners of the written document were very slim.
F. Textual Adaptation of a Masculine Image
To sum up the above five points, it seems that the text itself speaks in a gendered language, 
winking at the masculine stereotypes while emphasizing a deterrence from association with 
feminine ones. Whether Coke was aware of this impact is highly doubtful, but it may also be 
less important. Two other points seem more imperative here. First, the fact that it is this text 
that survived through the centuries and has been quoted repeatedly is remarkable. For some 
reason Coke’s phrasing “made sense” for generations to come and I think that the reason for 
this had much to do with the structuring of gender in our society. The oppositions that were 
used, as well as the way of putting things “in order” and under control, probably correlated 
and resonated with what was encrypted in the developing modern legal minds. Saying that 
the rational approach is better than the irrational one, to use only one example, probably felt 
natural and axiomatic – reflecting the way things are without the need to claim how they 
should be, just as men are, as a matter of fact, more dominant than women. 
145 See, e.g., Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice,66 NYU L. REV. 1559 
(1991); John Wightman, Intimate Relationships, Relational Contract Theory, and the Reach of Contract, 8 
FEMINIST LEGAL STUDIES 93, 98-102 (2000).
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The second point concerns legitimacy and authority. For reasons that I will discuss in the 
fourth part, Coke’s goal appears to have been to build a better image for the Common Law. If 
one is engaged in such a mission, then describing the law as more masculine-like and less 
womanly is a fruitful and powerful rhetoric, one that has the ability to establish authority and 
legitimacy.146  It is, to use Stanley Fish’s words, an “amazing trick” that is done by the law –
“its ability to construct the (verbal) ground upon which it then confidently walks.”147
Nicolette
She lost her home. 
The year was 2003 and she enjoyed legal personhood and had the ability to be a party to the 
contract with John. And yet the contractual texts only described how she received her home 
as a gift from John and how, only few months later, she gave it back to him. The judges 
treated every other part of her story as irrelevant. But, the decision what is relevant and what 
is not is seldom a neutral one. The exclusion of the context by means of adherence to the text 
necessarily involves the creation and inclusion of a different context – one which does not 
exist in reality. This new imaginary context is loaded with monogamist patriarchal values. 
The opening sentence of the appellate decision presents Nicolette as a nanny and declares 
that she worked for “John and Lynn, husband and wife”.148 The rest of the judicial text 
diminishes the ongoing relationship Nicolette had with John, acknowledging only the most 
necessary facts regarding their joint son. Furthermore, the judges tell us how she “and the 
146 I will elaborate on this idea by comparing Coke’s efforts to Portia’s efforts in the fourth section.
147
 I thank Kathryn Abrams for this way of putting the point and for referring me to Fish’s helpful metaphor. See 
also, Kathryn Abrams, REVIEW ESSAY: The Unbearable Lightness of Being Stanley Fish: THERE'S NO SUCH 
THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING, TOO, 47 STAN. L. REV. 595, 602 (1995).
148
 Clark v. Hannah-Clark, supra note 2 (Italics added).
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boy moved into the [cottage] located near John and Lynn’s home”.149 Notice the sense of 
invasion and penetration created by this phrasing. Is it not obvious that as a single mother 
with a newborn child (not a boy) she could not do such a thing without, at a minimum, John’s 
invitation and Lynn’s silent consent?
Of course the unusual state of a married couple and their children living together with the 
husband’s lover and their illegitimate child, for years, could have been seen as a real 
challenge to the stereotyped monogamist patriarchal model. However, these special 
circumstances were “translated” by the court into the standard patriarchal terms. In the thrifty 
judicial text it was emphasized – twice – that Lynn did not know a thing, portraying her 
mainly as the betrayed wife. As part of this naïve description we are told that during all these 
years Lynn adored Nicolette and John’s son and treated him as her own grandson.150
What an amazing image this extraordinary choice of words creates: the whole unorthodox 
situation is normalized by a serene depiction of an even bigger “normal” patriarchal family, 
consisting in its adapted state of three generations: grandchildren, parents and grandparents. 
In this way the image of a “warm-hearted granny” is added to Lynn’s portrait and further 
strengthens the need to protect her from her younger rival, that is, the need to protect 
traditional family values. 
By suggesting this reading of the judicial decision I intend to call attention to the 
manipulative potential of the textual approach,151 and especially its patriarchal content. Just 
as a judge in Isabel’s times knew very well that women like her could not influence the 
149 Id.
150 Id. (“Lynn adored the child and treated him as grandchild”). 
151
 Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
1710, 1731 (1997). Captivatingly, the author argues – from a very different point of view – that the parol 
evidence rule (or the plain meaning rule as he refers to it) is used in a manipulative way (“the rule is used 
mainly as a rhetorical device, aimed at disguising the active role courts play in contract interpretation.”), Id. at 
1731.
58
contractual words that controlled their lives, so are judges in Nicolette’s times fully aware of 
the disparity of power between a famous and wealthy Hollywood couple and the “nanny of 
their daughter”. 
The nature of life dictates that the professionals who deal with contracts interpretation do 
have the context, or at least a part thereof, in mind. As a result, the refusal to even consider 
the context, the conscious choice to ignore it, is more than an omission. De facto it can be 
seen, somewhat post-modernly, as actively creating and then taking into account a 
manufactured context – one that does not exist. This context assumes, however implicitly, a 
reality which all know to be fictitious: as if Nicolette had sat in front of John and, utilizing 
her own rich legal and business experience, carefully negotiated, on an equal basis, the words 
of her contracts.
I imagine it is still possible to dismiss this disturbing contemporary example, perhaps by 
seeing the gendered results of rigid textuality as a mere coincidence. It is this last argument 
that pushes me to revisit early-modern England and to revert from Nicolette to Isabel, in 
search of an even deeper level of analysis. What follows, then, is a closer examination of the 
ideas, theories, impulses and intuitions that informed the establishment of the parol evidence 
rule by Coke’s report of the Case.
IV. COKE’S REPORT
To hold Sir Edward Coke responsible for the establishment of the contractual parol evidence 
rule requires some justification. After all, he was only the reporter of the Case and as such 
might be regarded as merely repeating what the King’s Bench judges, led by Judge Popham, 
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had been saying.  Yet several reasons suggest that such a narrow view of Coke’s report of 
this Case is inadequate. 
In the first place, Coke was not just yet another reporter, he was the reporter, and the only 
reporter who did not have to attach his name to his volumes of reports: considered to be the 
prototype, they were simply called “reports”. He served as a Member of Parliament, Solicitor 
General, Attorney General, Chief Justice of Common Pleas, and Chief Justice of the King’s 
Bench. Add to this his comprehensive writings about the rules of England – the four volumes 
of the Institutes of the Laws of England – and it becomes evident how he came to be known 
as the supreme oracle of English law,152 “what Shakespeare has been to literature.”153 In 
other words, no other English jurist of his time had gained more authority of the kind needed 
to establish new rules of law. 
Secondly, we are fortunate enough to have another report of the same legal episode made by 
an additional reporter of the period, Sir George Croke.154 According to his report, the ruling 
of the Case was based on the more traditional idea of estoppel and not on the novel idea of 
the parol evidence rule.155 Contrasting these two reports suggests that it is Coke, more than 
the Judges of the King’s Bench, who we should credit with the construction of the parol 
evidence rule. Indeed, based on a similar method of comparison – i.e., to an alternative report 
regarding the same case – it was argued that the rule in the prominent Shelly’s case “owes its 
authority to Coke, not to the decision.”156
152 HELGERSON, supra note 124, at 85. BOYER, supra note 78, at ix-x.
153 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 132 (1926).
154 CROKE’S REPORT, supra note 45.
155 MACNAIR, supra note 42, at 139.
156 BOYER, supra note 78, at 117.
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Thirdly, Coke is considered by many to have been the kind of reporter who would liberally 
insert his own comments in his reports while “not distinguishing…his own views from those 
he was reporting”.157 And finally, and even more generally, Coke was a zealous 
representative of a generation of reporters who believed that the historical accuracy of the 
report and its faithfulness to the original were less important than the publication of the 
“correct” legal doctrine for the purposes of future use.158 As part of this “liberal” concept of 
reporting, it was argued that while “reporting” Coke made an effort to place a “substantive 
gloss” on the Common Law.159 One of his techniques was to emphasize a general principle 
that did not actually serve as the basis for the judgment in the particular nuanced case but 
was – at best – part of its obiter dicta.160 This understanding of Coke’s general methodology 
appears to fit our Case nicely, since (as mentioned) the general rule he reported does not lead 
to the concrete result of the Case.  
In light of the four aspects briefly explored above, it seems probable that it was Sir Edward 
Coke who developed the parol evidence rule out of the judicial decision in the Case of the 
Countess of Rutland. Put succinctly, we can say that Coke had both the opportunity and the 
motive to create such a rule at such a time. I will start by exploring the possible motivations 
that moved Coke to use his reporting capacity for the purpose of elevating the written 
contractual text. As we shall see, the concept which is represented by the parol evidence rule 
ties in with Coke’s more general ideas and ideologies in a way that can shed light on both the 
rule’s nature and the reasons for its formation.
157 BAKER, supra note 113, at 183. Damian Powell, Coke in Context: Early Modern Legal Observation and Sir 
Edward Coke’s Reports, 21 JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY 33, 47 (2000). 
158 BAKER, Id. 183;  Daniel J. Hulsebosch, An ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward 
Coke’s British Jurisprudence, 21 LAW AND HISTORY REVIEW 439, 455 (2003); For a similar argument see 
Powell, Id. at  41.
159
 Hulsebosch, Id.at 469.
160
 Theodore F.T. Plucknett, The Genesis of Coke’s Reports, 27 CORNELL L. Q. 190, 212 (1942).
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A. Elevating the Common Law
“…the common law is the best and most common birth-right that the subject hath for 
the safeguard and defence, not onely of his goods, lands and revenues, but of his wife 
and children, his body, fame and life also.”161
These famous words written by Sir Edward Coke capture what appears to have been the 
prevailing idea that drove his legal work: his boundless belief in the supremacy of the 
Common Law over any alternative legal system and his ongoing struggle to strengthen this 
superiority and to reinforce the dominance of the Common Law. Coke’s general commitment 
to the task of elevating the Common Law is much too expansive and profound to be 
addressed here in detail - however, what appears crucial to the linkage between Coke’s work 
and the parol evidence rule is the multidimensional way in which his obsession with the 
Common Law led him to the battle between the oral and the written: a battle of immense 
importance to our understanding of the creation of the rule.
1. The Common Law vs. the Roman Law
In 1571, when Coke left Cambridge to become a student of the law, Roman civil law had 
been already adopted by Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Holland, and – most 
meaningfully – by Scotland too. The process, also known as the “reception”, generated 
considerable legal anxiety in 16th century England. England had not been part of the 
reception process and the common view had been until then that the English law should stay 
insular and different.162 Nonetheless, we can imagine that retaining a system so manifestly 
different from that of the neighboring world might become a tremendously trying experience 
161 SIR EDWARD COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (A Systematic Arrangement by J. H. 
Thomas, London: 1818), 11.
162 HELGERSON, Supra note 124, 67.
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and the source of a great sense of inferiority. Indeed, “on the Continent, the English law was 
looked on as brutal”,163 but a critique from within, made in the 1530s by Thomas Starkey, 
also condemned the English legal practice as medieval and barbarous.164
The attacks were obviously a source of significant apprehension and produced a defensive 
response accompanied by a desire for some assimilation. Calls for legal reform, calls to join 
Europe by adopting some version of the Roman civil law, were starting to be heard – and the 
idea that England needed a written law was growing out of the combination between two 
different schools of thought: Renaissance humanism and English Nationalism.165 In 1535 a 
proposal was presented to King Henry III, a “discourse touching the Reformations of the 
Laws of England”, written by Richard Morrison. What was suggested was actually writing 
the law, and Morison was paraphrased to say:
“What the Romans did the English can and should do. They should write the law, 
produce an English equivalent of the Corpus Juris Civilis. Not only would such a 
book remedy the law’s confusion and uncertainty, it would stand as a mark of civility, 
a mark of England’s freedom from barbarism.”166
This call remained unanswered for several decades. The mission was too challenging and 
intimidating. If possible at all, it requires a rare jurist who is shrewd, learned, ambitious, 
highly respected, experienced, self-confident, meticulous, and so on and so forth. It was Coke 
who had all these qualities (in large quantities) and who took upon himself the lifelong 
mission of writing down the laws of England. Other than him “no one had attempted a 
picture so comprehensive, legal exposition on so grand a scale”.167 First came his 11 volumes 
163 BOWEN, supra note 79, 64.
164 HELGERSON, Supra note 124, 65.
165 Id. at 101.
166 Id. at 70.
167 BOWEN, supra note 79, at 508.
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of the reports and they were then followed by his four volumes of the institutes: “together 
they should represent the whole law of England, spread upon paper for students to learn and 
see.”168
Coke wrote for years with “a persistent awareness of a rival system of law against which 
English law had to defend and define itself”.169 Moreover, by writing these laws down he
was trying to create a new image for them. No longer would they be the lived memory of 
small professional communities; instead, they would become something else: more stable, 
more systematic, more approachable and, above all, more civilized. In other words, 
something that could compete with the Roman law. 
It is worth stressing for our purposes that putting the law in writing was a way of fighting for 
the Common Law’s authority. In contrast to the Roman code, here the written result was not 
the authentic law, but a strategic representation of the law. The law itself remained oral, 
chiefly what the judges had said, for years, in courts. Indeed, Coke himself pointed to the risk 
inherent to this oral nature of the English law and explained the importance of writing by 
warning against the phenomenon of “slippery memory”. Interestingly, he used this same 
phrase again and again, including in our parol evidence rule Case, whenever he wanted to 
justify writing. The danger of “slippery memory” was the danger of the “slippery slope”, the 
danger of losing authority. So, by mimicking the Roman law technique of writing, Coke tied 
the Common Law to one of the most admired characteristics of its rival, and could thus 
present the Common Law as the “most equal, most certain, of greatest antiquity and least 
delay, and most beneficial and easy to be observed.”170
168 Id. at 508.
169 HELGERSON, Supra note 124, at 70. 
170
 2 CO. REP., opening sentences of the preface.
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2. The Common Law vs. the Oaths
The Common Law was threatened by its “barbarous” image not only because of the 
widespread reception of Roman law, but also as a result of the flaws of its own procedures. 
Chief among these was wager of law - an archaic procedure, originally used in local courts 
all over England and a very popular defense method in cases of unpaid debt. When sued for 
not paying their debt, the defendants could ask to “wage” (that is, make) their law by taking 
an oath that they do not owe the money or the goods in question. The defendant would then 
bring eleven neighbors or friends (compurgators) who strengthened the initial oath by taking 
a secondary oath that the defendant is trustworthy and their oath was good.  As time passed, 
this procedure expanded from the local courts to the central courts in Westminster, where it 
became increasingly unfeasible to bring close neighbors or friends to support the defendant’s 
claims.171 A fictional practice of using “professionals”, hired oath-helpers, also known as 
“knights of the post”, was developed to cope with this problem.
At the end of the sixteenth century and at the beginning of the seventeenth century pamphlets 
were mocking the oath-helpers who “will swear you anything for twelve pence”, and the 
period’s literature was full of references to the corruption of the knights of the post.172
Dependence upon this old procedure entailed such risk to one’s reputation that even its 
classic beneficiaries, the defendants, were increasingly deterred from relying on it.173 Not 
surprisingly, the practice of waging the law came at the price of increasing disrespect for, and 
diminishing faith in, the legal system that used it and relied on it to do justice. As Lorna 
171 BAKER, supra note 113, at 74. 
172
 Lorna Hutson, Not the King’s Two Bodies: Reading the ‘Body Politic’ in Shakespeare’s Henry IV,  in
RHETORIC AND LAW IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 166, 184-185 (Victoria Kahn & Lorna Hutson eds. 2001).
173
 To use David Ibbetson’s words: “to wage one’s law was tantamount to admitting liability and refusing to pay 
the debt due. A gentleman would not, dared not, wage his law even when confronted with a packed jury of an 
obviously unfounded claim.” David Ibbetson, Sixteenth Century Contract Law: Slade’s Case in Context, 4 
OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 295, 312-313 (1984).
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Hutson notes, “In literary texts, the openness of wager of law to abuse became symbolic of 
wider corruption in judicial and political systems.”174
The use of oaths at the turn of the sixteenth century was therefore something that needed to 
be abolished and it was, again – like writing the law – a mission for Coke to fulfill.175 He did 
this by challenging the system of oaths as part of his argument in the famous Slade’s case. 
The decision in this case practically eradicated the wager of law. 
A keystone of the modern law of contract, Slade’s case, which was litigated during the years 
of 1597-1602,176 is known for its legal recognition of “implied promises” arising from a 
contract.177 However, as David Sacks pointed out, legal historians tend to agree that the 
decision in Slade was at its time mainly:
“a vehicle for accomplishing what the lawyers and judges were really after – namely, 
the displacement of the older forms of action in contract with new ones capable of 
attracting potential plaintiffs to the common law courts…”178
We will go back to these marketing efforts later, but for now it is important to see more 
generally the pains that Coke had taken to extricate the Common Law from the corrupted and 
barbarous stigma caused by oaths, and to portray the Common Law as a more rational and 
better controlled legal system. In this regard Coke had to address the claim that it was 
inappropriate to allow plaintiffs to opt for a procedure that would deny the defendants’ 
174
 Hutson, supra note 172, at 187. Among the most influential Elizabethan authors who dealt with the problem 
of oaths was William Shakespeare, BOYER, supra note 78, at 133.
175
 Meaningfully, it was Judge Popham - Coke’s mentor, the head of the King’s Bench and, the same judge who 
was reported by Coke as forming the parol evidence rule in our Case - who entrusted the Case in Coke’s 
experienced hands.
176
 These dates, as well as the contractual context and the identity of its reporter, make Slade’s case entirely 
relevant to the discussion regarding our Case of 1604.
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 The recognition of implied promises was necessary in order to facilitate the use of the new action of 
assumpsit in a larger variety of contractual situations, including cases in which the plaintiff could have used the 
old form of action of debt.
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 David Harris Sacks, The Promise and the Contract in Early Modern England: Slade’s Case in Perspective, 
in RHETORIC AND LAW IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE, supra note 172, 28, 37 (emphasizes added).
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“right” to wage their law. It was argued that this was especially inequitable in situations 
where defendants had fulfilled their share in the transaction privately and hence could not 
otherwise prove their innocence.179
To this Coke replied that the reliance upon oaths “induces men… to perjury”.180 At the 
practical level his argument, albeit cynical, was at once rational, practical and highly 
educational: the debtor should obtain a receipt.181 Here, again, we see Coke dealing 
pragmatically with the tension between the oral (the private payment) and the written (the 
receipt) and preferring the tangible record over the elusive oaths. At the policy level his 
argument embraced the King’s Bench modern view that considered the wager of law an 
“anachronistic and irrational mode of trial”182 and hence offered a trial by jury. 
Whether the trial by jury of the early-modern times was indeed better is highly doubtful,183
but nevertheless what is important to our discussion is that it had the appearance of being 
more rational and therefore was considered an improvement. At any rate, the combination of  
both the practical level and the policy level of Coke’s response led to the conclusion that the 
best, if not the only, way to refrain from being charged for breaching one’s contract is to 
present tangible proof to the jury. 
179 BOYER, supra note 78, at 130. The defendant could wage his law only in the old-fashioned action upon debt 
and not in the newer and emerging action of assumpsit.
180 Slade’s case, 4 CO. REP. 91, 95a.
181 BOYER, supra note 78, at 130. (as Boyer interestingly adds “Coke’s estate records…show that this was his 
own careful practice.”)
182
 Ibbetson, supra note 173, 312.
183 A. W. B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 139 (1975) (“A fifteenth-century jury 
was an oath-taking body which closely resembled a set of eleven compurgators, the main difference being the 
fact that its composition was not determined by the defendant.”);  Ibbetson, Id. at 312. The dissatisfaction from 
a trial by jury as a substitute for wager of law was so deep that it finally led to the legislation of the Statue of 
Frauds in 1677. Generally, this legislation, which was cancelled only in 1954, insisted on the requirement of 
writing and it made certain classes of oral contract completely unenforceable. BAKER, supra note 113, at 348-
350.  
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Focusing on the cancellation of wager of law we can see that Slade’s case involves a series 
of dichotomies: oaths/jury, mystical/rational, medieval /Common Law, ancient/modern, 
corrupt/fair, suspect/trustworthy, etc. Paralleling these dichotomies we can perceive this case 
as representing a move184 away from the first element, towards the second element of each 
dichotomy. Coke’s practical suggestion – that the debtor should keep documents that could 
prove payment – raises, again, another dichotomy, which correlates with the above move, the 
one of the oral vs. the written. The “written” symbolizes tangibly the superior term in each of 
the above dichotomies: the rational, modern, fair and trustworthy Common Law, a law which 
was wise enough to get rid of the oaths in 1602. 
One result of the Slade’s case move was that many more oral contracts could now be 
litigated under the Common Law through the action of assumpsit.185 This probably raised a 
series of questions about the status of the oral newcomers in relation to the familiar written 
contracts. 
Was Coke, already occupied by the clash between the written and the oral in the greater 
context of the competition with the written civil law, aware that this complication was to 
follow from his victory in Slade’s? It is hard to know the answer. However, if he did have 
this potential conflict in mind, this might explain why he made such an effort to establish the 
parol evidence rule through our Case, even though it was not required given its concrete 
facts. 
184
 On seeing Slade’s case as a “move” as opposed to “mentalité” see Sacks, supra note 178, at 37. As Sacks 
argues “moves are highly sensitive to the particularities of the historical setting in which they are made.” `
185 BAKER, supra note 113, at 346.
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3. The Common Law vs. the Common People
What is to date considered as Coke’s leading contribution to the modernization of the 
medieval version of the Common Law is the concept of “artificial reason”.186 The idea was 
twofold: firstly, that the Common Law is a product of reason and hence reasonable and, 
secondly, that this reason is not natural reason, but something else, artificial and perfect. In 
Coke’s famous words:
“Reason is the life of the law, nay the common law itself is nothing else but reason, 
which is to be understood as an artificial perfection of reason.”187
The first layer of Coke’s concept placed “reason” at the core of law. Such a view afforded the 
Common Law a much-needed unifying method, one that could tie together the dispersed 
precedents that had been building up within it for so many years.188 Coke’s definition of the 
law as based upon reason provided the judges with a common tool of assessment: “what they 
found reasonable, the judges approved; whatever failed to meet the test of reason, they struck 
down”.189 This brilliant idea made the law appear fundamentally coherent.  All of a sudden 
the Common Law seemed to have “common sense”, and with Coke’s brush it was painted as 
rational, consistent and logical. Simultaneously, this magical concept increased the judges’ 
credibility and reliability, for they were the users of the efficient tool of reason and, as a 
result, they became the source of reason, its carrier and its reflection. Combined together, 
these two improvements – of both the law’s image and that of its judges – contributed 
immensely to the strengthening of the Common Law’s authority. 
186
 Shaunnagh Dorsett, 'Since Time Immemorial': A Story of Common Law Jurisdiction, Native Title and the 
Case of Tanistry, 26 MELBOURNE U. L.R. 32, 37 (2002) .
187
 COke, supra note 161, 1.
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 John Lewis, Sir Edward Coke (1552-1633): His Theory of ‘Artificial Reason’ as a Context for Modern Basic 
Legal Theory, 64 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 330, 339 (1968).
189 BOYER, supra note 78, at 106.
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It is important to notice that even Coke’s choice to use the term “reason” is extremely 
significant. As indicated earlier, we know he was acutely aware of the increasing appeal of 
the sophisticated, elegant and classical Roman law. We may assume that being so 
knowledgeable and well-read190 he had known the Roman maxim that one should follow 
reason rather than precedents.191 This maxim plainly assumes a contradiction between 
“reason” and “precedent”. Against this background, Coke – in an act of alchemy – turned 
precedent into reason. He took the term “reason” and used it as interchangeable with 
precedent: the judicial point of view was reason and following precedents was therefore 
reasonable.  Looking closely at the choice of the word “reason” (for instance in the above 
quote whereby “the common law itself is nothing else but reason”) we can see the labored 
effort that Coke made in presenting the Common Law as though it resembled the respected 
Roman law without changing its true nature. It was, I maintain, mainly a change of image 
rather than a substantive transition. 
The second layer of Coke’s idea, the “artificial” part, served as a way of distinguishing legal
reason, reasoning and reasonableness from the more “natural” traits of reason. To Coke 
artificial reason was anything but the ordinary understanding of the human brain. It was 
artificial in the sense of “man-made”, something that emerges from an extremely 
professional process and, to use Coke’s original words, “not of every man’s natural 
reason”.192 So different from the normal way of thinking, such legalized reasoning involved, 
to use Coke’s words again, “long study, observation and experience.”193
190 BOWEN, supra note 79, at 200.
191 BAKER, supra note 113, at 196-197.
192 COKE, supra note 161, 1.
193 COKE, Id. For a description of such professionalism as “art” see Charles Gray, Reason, Authority, and 
Imagination: The Jurisprudence of Sir Edward Coke, in CULTURE AND POLITICS FROM PURITANISM TO THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT 25-66, 61 (Perez Zagorin ed. 1980).
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To view law as defined by artificial reason and artificial reason as reserved for legal 
specialists was quite a patronizing move. As Hulsebusch put it, Coke “championed the 
“artificial reason” of the legal community above the natural reason of the individual.”194 No 
doubt such a vision powerfully symbolized and at the same time reinforced the superiority of 
the Common Law and its experts. Yet, such a vision also evidently distanced and rejected the 
common people, those who often needed the legal services. 
In a way which is meaningful to the connection between the status of the Common Law and 
that of writing, part of this distancing project was attained by the use of written lingual tools. 
The reasoned law, as written by Coke and others, was written in an especially reserved 
language, one which no “ordinary” person could fully understand.195 This strange, if not 
secret, language even had a symbolic name: “Law-French”, a name that captures neatly the 
condescending character of the “members-only” legal club. Other than exposing the true 
demeaning spirit of “artificial reason”, it is worth seeing how such a name also constitutes a 
nod to Europe. However, just like writing an English version of Institutions and just like 
talking of “reason” instead of using the term precedents, this too was only a cosmetic 
maneuver: the words were seldom in “real” French and the content was totally English-made. 
As we shall now see, the two layers of “reason” and of “artificial” are important to the 
creation of the parol evidence rule. This can be illustrated by a telling example that preceded 
194
 Hulsebosch, supra note 158, at 460.
195 This conceited and insular attitude played a central roll in the debate over whether to print the Common 
Law and thereby make it more accessible to the lay (sometimes named “vulgar”) people. To a fascinating 
description of the debate and its philosophical and cultural grounds see Richard J. Ross, The Commoning of 
the Common Law: The Renaissance Debate Over Printing English Law, 1520-1640, 146 U. P A. L. REV. 323 
(1998). I will quote two fine examples: “ ‘Which of us has not heard it objected,’ asked Thomas Wentworth 
in The Office and Duty of Executors (1641), ‘that we the professors of the law, seek to hide and secret the 
knowledge thereof under this dark and distasted’ French language?” (Id. at 372); “Edward Coke printed his 
Reports but composed them in law French like the medieval yearbooks ‘lest the unlearned by bare reading 
without right understanding might suck out errors, and trusting to their conceit, might endamage themselves, 
and sometimes fall into destruction.’ ” (Id. at 376).
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our Case – the well-known Shelly’s case,196 in which Coke’s argument won him enormous 
reputation.197 The dispute concerned the interpretation of a contractual formula that was 
commonly used in family settlements, in which owners of land tried to control the future of 
their estates.  Edward Shelly used the formula of to A (himself) for life, then to the heirs of A 
in order to pass on his estates (or the major part thereof) to his grandson from his deceased 
first son. The problem, however, was that this grandson was not yet born when Edward used 
this formula and therefore at that specific point in time Edward’s male heir was still Richard 
Shelly, Edward’s brother. Richard’s claim was that using the above formula gave him an 
immediate interest in Edward’s estates, one which could not be rescinded by later incidents 
such as the appearance of a newborn grandson. The grandson’s counterclaim was that the 
transfer only happened after Edward’s death, a time in which he (and not his uncle Richard) 
was the closest male-heir.198
What is important, in the present context, is that Shelly’s Case emphasizes the strong 
connection between the idea of artificial reason as a locus of legal expertise, on the one hand, 
and the interpretation of legal (and specifically contractual) language on the other. Richard’s 
elite lawyers creatively emphasized the need to respect Edward’s intention at the time of 
writing, which they took as the impartation of an immediate entitlement to his brother. 
Opposing them stood Coke, who represented Edward’s grandson and argued for a 
“reasonable” interpretation of the legal formula.199 To him “reasonable” meant the way legal 
experts of the time would write and read the formula that Edward used. Such an argument 
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 1 CO. REP. 88b, I ANDERSON 69, MOORE 136, 3 DYER 373b (1581).
197 BAKER, supra note 113, 286. For detailed analysis of the case see A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN 
THE COMMON LAW (1995).
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 The facts of this case are also fascinating from a feminist point of view but this dimension is regretfully too 
complex to be elucidated here. EILEEN SPRING, LAW, LAND AND FAMILY: ARISTOCRATIC INHERITANCE IN 
ENGLAND 1300-1800 138 (1993) (“To B’s son if he should have a son, but to his younger brother if he should 
not, is a limitation that cuts out in advance B’s female heirs”), emphasis added.
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 Interestingly, John Popham, the Judge in our Case, was part of the defense trio that represented the grandson 
Henry Shelly. BOWEN, supra note 79, at 116.
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was based on a literal approach to lawyers’ language – a language that became the visible 
symbol of their expertise. At a very practical level this kind of “artificial reasoning” ruled out 
the thesis of immediate inheritance by Richard and brought Coke’s client, Edward’s 
grandson, the victory. 
However, what is even more important for the current discussion is that the same reasoning 
rejected the relevancy of other understandings of identical language and left out the social, 
political or personal meaning of the legal words. Coke’s innovation was at this later level: 
although his argumentation followed the old feudal rules and caused the court to reaffirm 
them – it carried with it radical change. As Allen Boyer has written:
“This was one of the most significant achievements of Coke’s era, and one of its most 
troubling. For the next four centuries, whenever the terms of a legal document 
required definition, English courts would apply the private, technical meaning current 
among the bar. When construing contracts, courts arrogated to themselves the 
construction of disputed terms, refusing to hear what the parties themselves had 
meant... Not until the 1950’s, prodded by Lord Denning, would the English bench 
once again begin to read documents in terms of the parties’ original intent.”200
From here the stretch to the first version of a contractual parol evidence rule seems quite 
easy: if legal documents speak (reasonably) in a professional language, which is so different 
from the natural language, then what justification can there be to accept evidence regarding 
the parties intentions? 
It also seems that the general idea of artificial reason as well as its more lingual derivative 
fitted neatly with Coke’s personal nature. Self-described as direct in his speech and a strong 
believer in bright line rules, Coke was known to prefer the most literal interpretation possible 
200 BOWEN, Id. at 120.
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to any legal written material, be it a statute, a will or a contract. His “plain-meaning” 
approach to questions of legal interpretation was well connected to his ways of thinking and 
talking, which in turn were not lacking their fair share of arrogance.201
In light of our focus on the Countess of Rutland’s Case, it is startling to see how in his report 
on Shelly’s case Coke seems to have told his readers much more than what was said in court 
and certainly more than what was stated in the actual judgment. In fact he was later blamed 
for reporting things “which had never been uttered in the courtroom.”202 The famous rule that 
evolved from Shelly’s case, the one concerning the distinctive legal meaning of the 
contractual formula, the one that prevailed for centuries, was not to be found in any other 
account of the same case. 
B. Marketing a New Image
1. Coke’s Efforts
As we have just seen, at the same period in which the Countess of Rutland was fighting for 
her land and Coke was writing his “take” on the judicial decision on the matter, the Common 
Law, too, was waging its own battle. In this multi-frontier battle Coke acted as if he was the 
“Secretary of Defense” for the Common Law – planning and executing the strategies.203
201 Id. 120-121, 199-204.
202
 Interestingly, due to the case’s importance the Queen intervened and all the judges were summoned to hear 
the case. Months after this special hearing they issued their judgment in favor of Coke’s client. Id. at 117. 
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 Other than the three battles discussed above (against the Roman law, the oaths and the ordinary people) there 
were two serious additional battles that were going on: the struggle against the King and his absolutism and the 
competition with Equity (and with Sir Francis Bacon). These two reached their peak slightly after the Case of 
the Countess of Rutland was decided and hence are not discussed here. However, these last two conflicts seem 
to fit in well with the general argument raised here that the birth of the parol evidence rule should be seen as 
part of the larger struggle for the Common Law’s status and authority. 
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This lifelong role that Coke took upon himself involved dealing continuously with the status 
of written words and their relationship to the authority of the Common Law. As 
demonstrated, defending the status of the Common Law – be it against the Roman law, the 
oaths or the ordinary people – involved considerable debate regarding the oral/written 
dichotomy. It appears that no easy solution was available to Coke, just as there might not be 
one for legal scholars nowadays. On the one hand, the Common Law was by its nature oral, 
but on the other hand it needed the writing in order to preserve and promote its authority. 
This dilemma is well captured in the following paragraph:
“The need of common lawyers to justify not only the content but the dignity of their 
law against the slurs of royalists, civilians, university scholars, country gentry, 
merchants, and divines, meant that lex scripta and lex non scripta, writing and 
oral/memorial tradition, opposed each other as ideal-typical constructs in debate as 
they worked together in practice. Unorganized, unfindable, uncertain, unsteady, 
primitive: These charges battered the unwritten common law.”204
What was taking place at the turn of the seventeenth century, including in our Case, can also 
be analyzed with postmodern tools. It is possible to say that instead of a pure dichotomy 
between the oral and the written, one which entails hierarchy and superiority of the oral, the 
two terms related to each other more interactively. The written was becoming more of a 
“dangerous supplement”, the “thing” that the oral was so dependent upon for the sake of 
preserving its own existence. So, to continue with the postmodern mind-set, around 1604 the 
hierarchy could be seen in a reverse way: if the oral needed the written so badly then was it 
not in fact the written which set the tone?205 At any rate, the very activity of writing what 
originally was of oral nature had an artificial quality, the exact effort that Coke seemed to be 
204
 Richard J. Ross, The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers: Memory as Keyword, Shelter, 
and Identity, 1560-1640, 10 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 229, 235 (1998).
205
 Balkin, supra note 138.
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occupied with when he was writing the law as well as when he was creating rules of law that 
dictated the supremacy of writing. 
Coke has been described as having engaged in “creating the secular myth of the common 
law”.206 In addition, his tactic can be seen as a campaign for improvement of image, one that 
was aimed at creating a better appearance for an aging product, an act of marketing. In this 
respect it has already been argued that Slade’s case – which brought litigation to the King’s 
Bench – was part of a market-driven process.207 This process, it has been argued, came out of 
a growing concern on the part of Common Lawyers and judges who felt that they were losing 
their business in the competition between the available courts of the period.208 My argument 
is broader and slightly more abstract. First, I believe the struggle for the elevation of the 
Common Law involved more than purely the narrow worries about personal profits, even 
though such concerns – especially in an era of rapid inflation – would certainly create a 
strong incentive. And second, by “marketing campaign” I mean something more expansive 
than simply offering “attractive deals” (as Slade’s case with its new option of assumsit might 
be seen). I suggest a multifaceted change of image that had the potential for long-term 
results, far beyond relieving the immediate economic anxieties of the lawyers and judges 
involved.209
What was needed under the marketing model, where the product was a legal system and 
services, was more credibility, trustworthiness, firmness, certainty, self-control, steadiness, 
206
 Peter Goodrich and Yifat Hachamovitch, Time out of Mind: An Introduction to the Semiotics of Common 
Law, in Dangerous Supplements: Resistance and Renewal in Jurisprudence 159, 171 (Peter Fitzpatrick ed. 
1991).
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 Sacks, supra note 178, at 37.
208 HELGERSON, supra note 124, at 66. The author presents the 1901 argument of the celebrated legal historian 
F. W. Maitland which included the following: “…the principal courts of the Common Law, had so little 
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 Note that not only the lawyers but also the judges were paid a fee for each case brought to them and hence 
had a very direct interest in the popularity of their legal system.
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and so on. What was required was to get rid of heavy loads of capriciousness, haziness, 
instability, irrationality, unpredictability, impulsiveness and the like. Skimming the above 
discussions again we can see that Coke did exactly that. 
In this light the formation of a rule like the parol evidence rule can be perceived as a 
miniature of the larger story of building a new image for the Common Law. Ev en though a 
contract is, philosophically, an unwritten creature, a meeting point of abstracts like minds, 
wills or intentions, rather than a tangible document, the parol evidence rule still reflects the 
fact that something is missing. By insisting on writing, the rule seeks authority which in turn 
derives from the solid image of the written word. 
The Countess of Rutland’s Case should be read, therefore, as part of a larger written cloak 
that covers the rules of interpretation of contracts. As such it should be read together with its 
better known allies: Slade’s case and Shelly’s case. Jointly they were part of one big 
campaign, which was aimed at building a newer and better image of the “rule of law” for the 
Common Law. 
The fact that all these cases belong to Coke’s legacy and are all “contractual” should not be 
seen as mere coincidence. In a period repeatedly characterized as based on a “culture of 
credit” the demand for contracts and, as a result, for contractual litigation and practical 
contract rules, was on the rise, and contract law served as a “testing ground” for the law in 
general. In other words, if contracts could be dealt with in a satisfactory manner under the 
Common Law, in such a period of need, then the achievement would be much greater and 
eventually exceed the contractual arena. It would bring more business to the Common 
Lawyers and judges and it would reflect and signify the law’s majestic power of being 
systematic, rational, organized, predictable and useful. The success of this marketing 
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campaign would represent Coke’s victory, on behalf of his biggest client ever: the Common 
Law.
Surely the idea of gender stereotypes did not even cross Coke’s mind at the time, but from a 
21st century perspective his defense strategy might be seen as attributing a more masculine-
like image to the Common Law while concealing feminine features. Again, but this time 
keeping gender in mind, it may be viewed as accrediting stereotypically-masculine qualities 
of credibility, trustworthiness, firmness, certainty, self-control, steadiness and so on, while 
hiding stereotypically-feminine traits of capriciousness, haziness, instability, irrationality, 
unpredictability, impulsiveness and the like. Such an observation raises two major questions 
with respect to the move from the “feminine” to the “masculine” as described above: first 
about the hegemonic rejection of the womanly qualities of the law and second about the 
artificiality of the whole transformation.
The first point is quite straightforward and it was explored earlier when I offered a close 
reading of Coke’s heavily quoted text. Being detached, patronizing, authoritative, rational, 
commercial and full of certainty, the parol evidence rule may serve as a silencing mechanism 
of more womanly voices. 
Pertaining to the point of artificiality, to ascribe a more masculine-like image to the Common 
Law was an artificial move rather than a deep conversion. To write the precedents, to switch 
from oaths to juries and to use artificial reason was to put on a manly mask and clothes that 
would hide the more stereotypically feminine sides of the law.  When Coke wrote the report 
of our Case and formed the contractual rule that gave priority to writings he did just that: he 
wrote a play in which the Common Law had the leading role and he dressed the Common 
Law as a man.
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2. Portia’s Efforts
Even though he probably did not meet William Shakespeare in person,210 Coke was certainly 
familiar with his play The Merchant of Venice, so popular in the years preceding the Case.211
Generally, as Luke Wilson said, it “seems beyond dispute that the meaning of contractual 
relations was a matter of particular concern at least roughly at the same time as the drama 
flourished in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.”212 More specifically, at least 
one early study of the legal scene in the fourth act of this famous play claimed that:
“If I were asked to name the three men in all England who were most profoundly 
affected by Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, I should unhesitatingly name the 
following: Sir Edward Coke, Sir Thomas Egerton…and Sir Francis Bacon.”213
At any rate, whether inspired by Shakespearean Portia or on his own initiative, Coke can be 
seen to have used the parol evidence rule in a manner parallel to Shakespeare’s use of 
Portia’s gender bending. 
In The Merchant of Venice, Portia disguises herself as a male lawyer in order to give a 
cunning speech, a feat of rationalism, in favor of Antonio, “the Merchant”, against Shylock, 
“the Jew”.  This disguise – and it alone – invests her with the elevated status of a lawyer, the 
respect of others, and eventually grants her the power of persuasion, admiration and prestige.  
210 BOYER, supra note 78, at 287.
211 As the fascinating 1935 work of Mark Edwin Andrews tells: “The Merchant of Venice was written before 
1598, for it is one of the six comedies specifically mentioned by Meres in his Palladis Tamia in 1598. It was 
very probably written after 1596 for in that year Sylvain’s Orator, a book which contained part of the argument 
of the bond plot, was published in English translation; thus, the conclusion that the play was presented for the 
first time late in the year 1596 or in 1597.” See MARK EDWIN ANDREWS, LAW VERSUS EQUITY IN THE 
MERCHANT OF VENICE 21 (Written in 1935 and published only much later in 1965). The play was first printed 
in 1600 and Andrews’ book contains a beautiful reproduction of the title page of this first quarto edition.
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 Luke Wilson, supra note 144, at 70-71.
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 Andrews, supra note 211 at 21 (emphasis in bold letters added). Andrews’ reading of the legal scene stresses 
another battle of Coke on behalf of the Common Law – the one against equity. Referring to this rivalry 
Andrews suggested that “Act IV, Scene i, of the play does not depict a legal quibble, as is often said, but is a 
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79
Only in the disguise of the “articulated lawyer”, that is to say, of a brilliant doctor of law, can 
she determine things with decisiveness.  Only as a man, and through “male” intellectual 
slyness, can she defeat Shylock, as one who knows.  If she had presented herself in her 
femininity and spoken through her true, emotional and romantic motives (to save Antonio in 
order to recapture her love and new husband, Bassanio) – would she have succeeded? Not 
likely. Support for this estimation may be found in Portia’s memorable speech in which she 
praises the quality of mercy, a stereotypically female quality.214 Her failure to alter the 
interpretation of the draconic loan contract by using a feminine voice, albeit wrapped in a 
masculine costume, suggests a view of what the appropriate gender performance is under 
law.
The loan bond stated that if Antonio did not redeem his debt, Shylock could claim a fine 
consisting of a pound of flesh, “fair” flesh to be cut and taken from Antonio.215  The “lesson” 
to be learned from the rejection of Portia’s attempt to call for compassion and benevolence is 
that in the interpretation of this commercial contract there is no room for such “soft” 
emotions, but rather, only for that which is termed law.  Portia uses, then, the only recourse 
left to her – she turns swiftly to the written words of the bond and reads them in the most 
literal way while employing the shrewdness of linguistic rationale. She holds fast to the 
language of the contract and to the principle that all that is not explicitly permitted is, 
therefore, forbidden. As the contract manifestly determines that the fine is a pound of flesh, 
but does not say that the fine includes blood, Shylock is allowed to collect his debt, but Portia 
warns him that he must not shed even a drop of Antonio’s blood, or he will endanger his 
214 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, Act Four, Scene One. The edition referred to herein is 
the Penguin Popular Classics Edition (London, 1994). 
215 Id. Act One, Scene Three: “Shylock: …Go with me to a Notary, seal me there/ Your single bond, and, in a 
merry sport,/ If you repay me not on such a day/…let the forfeit/ Be nominated for an equal pound/ Of your fair 
flesh, to be cut off and taken/ In what part of your body pleaseth me.  Antonio: …I’ll seal to such a bond,/ And 
say there is much kindness in the Jew.”
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property as well as his life. This sophisticated logical analysis is what finally brings her the 
cries of admiration, “upright judge…enlightened judge.”216
Indeed, Portia’s “intellectual” acrobatics are presented to the viewer as the height of legal-
contractual ability and as ensuring her professional reverence. Holding to the written words 
and speaking about their meaning in a rational manner is offered by Shakespeare as a way of
gaining both authority and success. Is this not the same thing that Coke was trying to achieve 
for the Common Law? Is it not what he was seeking while reporting the Countess of 
Rutland’s Case? And, lastly, does not Portia as well as the parol evidence rule present an 
artificial image of rationalism which conceals something which is far less rational?
Having suggested this similarity it is worth pointing to one major difference between the 
writings of Shakespeare and Coke. While Portia’s real identity and motives are well 
recognized by the play’s audience, this is not true of the readers of the legal report. In 
contrast to theater-goers, these readers might not suspect, perhaps not even today, that the 
hierarchical and rigid parol evidence rule entails a disguise that hides the real nature of 
contractual interpretation or that of the law at large.
This disparity is quite meaningful and may offer a better appreciation of the legal rule. The 
theater-goers not only know very well that Portia is not a man, that she is bending her gender 
performance - they are also fully aware of the active effort she is making to hide her true 
identity and to pretend to be something that she is not. This act of imitating men – their 
voice, their rough steps, their brags and lies and their clothes –217 by one who is originally “a 
Lady… fair, and, fairer than that word”218 is significant. It exposes the artificial nature of her 
“masculine” speech regarding the pound of flesh. This imitation is completely at odds with 
the declared gender conception of the play (which reflects traditional gender stereotypes), 
216 Id. Act Four, Scene One.
217 Id.  Act Three, Scene Four.
218 Id. Act One, Scene One (Bassanio’s description of Portia).
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according to which “a maiden hath no tongue, but thought.”219 The effect of the plain act of 
imitation hence becomes dramatic: it is converted into an act of mockery and it gains a 
subversive meaning. The loud and open simulation turns the rational-logical-linguistic 
process of interpretation, as performed by Portia, into a “freak-show” and it exposes (and 
presents) its artificial nature. 
This imitation, the disguise, purporting to be something she is not, undermines the unity of 
the masculine image of the law.  It is true that everyone admires Portia for the fact that she 
saved Antonio from Shylock’s clutches, but does the deceit not leave us with an unsavory 
taste?  Is there anyone who senses that the loan contract was indeed properly interpreted?220
The fact that Portia is not a “real” legal expert also reduces our belief in the legal outcome. 
Had Shakespeare written about a real doctor of law who interpreted the contract, we would 
perhaps have been more trustful. The disguise creates a significant fracture in the rational 
legal façade and brings its limitations to the front of the stage, in both senses of the phrase.221
And this, in my eyes, is the most important feminist contribution to the matter at hand: when 
a woman imitates a man and acquires a male image, she nevertheless remains a woman.  As a 
consequence, the image – which is originally an entirely masculine one – is imbued with a 
new meaning, one which suggests a critical look at the origin. In other words, there is a 
challenging and thought-provoking dimension to the activity of the copycat in a field, namely 
the legal one, which was originally designed by actual men.222  The “pretend man”, by her 
219 Id. Act Three, Scene Two (Portia to Bassanio).
220 STEWART MACAULY, JOHN KIDWELL, WILLIAM WHITFORD AND MARC GALANTER (eds.) CONTRACTS: 
LAW IN ACTION Vol. 2, 696 (1995). Such frustration was also used to support claims regarding the Anti-Semitic 
nature of the play.
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always shifting. See, for instance, GREENBLATT, supra note 22, at 222. 
222 We all should keep in mind that at the times of The Merchant of Venice no real female-lawyer had ever been 
seen. The cultural effect, perhaps even the shock, of seeing and listening to a woman who acts like a lawyer, 
might be compared to the modern-day effect of seeing Matthew Bourne's ground-breaking all-male "Swan 
Lake”. Here I draw upon Judith Butler’s seminal work regarding “parodic performance” and the subversive 
nature of the mechanism of evident imitation. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 137 (1990) ("In 
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very appearance in the men’s arena, exposes the artificial nature inherent in the binary 
division into male and female professions, male and female literature, male and female 
justice. Crossing the gender lines, even if in disguise, casts a doubting light on the lines’ 
existence and threatens to erase them.  If all a woman needs to do in order to be a man is to 
dress up like one, then all of the many filaments built upon the gender images are likely to 
collapse.
Returning from Venice to the interpretation of contracts in the real courts of England, we 
may now see more clearly the motivations for covering this process with the distinguished 
costume of the parol evidence rule. Through these theater binoculars the disguise may be 
seen as another act of marketing on the part of contract law in order to sell itself and the 
ideological method within which it operates.223  In order to be heard, contract law and 
Common Law at large, like Portia, needed to assume the costume of a rational expert. It 
seems that Shakespeare and Coke would have both agreed that adhering to the written words 
of the contract would serve as the best signifier of such rationality. The fact that Shakespeare 
told his audience about the costuming, while Coke hid it from his readers, further supports 
the argument that Coke was engaged in a marketing campaign.   
Nicolette
She lost her home.
The parol evidence rule ruled out her situation, her hardship, her need to provide for the 
future of her only child, her dependence on the man who loved her, her incapacity to affect 
imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself--as well as its contingency,"); 
See also Zachary Potter & C.J. Summers, Reconsidering, Epistemology and Ontology in Status Identity 
Discourse: Make-Believe and Reality in Race, Sex, and Sexual Orientation, 17 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 113 
(2001) (suggesting a theoretical framework that the authors name as “factionalism” in order to clarify and 
expand upon the arguments in post-structural projects, such as Judith Butler's deconstruction of the sex/gender 
binary). 
223
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the written contractual words. Sure, nothing was personal. It is, after all, so she was surely 
told, an established rule, four hundred years old, and back then, in the old days, they did not 
know a thing about her, about Hollywood or about gender bias. 
And what if Isabel, the Countess of Rutland, could have heard Nicolette’s story? Coming 
from a different age she probably could not really understand what the term “gender bias” 
means or even what gender is, but she surely could tell Nicolette so much about her 
experience: her hardship, her need to provide for the future of her only child, her dependence 
on the man who loved her, and, lastly, her incapacity to affect the written contractual words.
CONCLUSION
Four hundred years have passed. And yet, it seems to me that so little has changed. Indeed, 
one can doubt the practical significance of the rule, both then and now,224 or, the other way 
around, one can admire the rule’s contribution to the functionality of contract law within the 
commercial sphere.225 However, when looking through these women’s eyes – as this research 
and analysis have sought to do – it becomes clear that the rule’s very presence, with all that it 
represents, has inherently biased and injurious outcomes. 
One may well admire Coke’s efforts to structure a rule of law in times of trouble as well as 
his contribution to the stabilization of a society in times of change. But even so, through 
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exposing the roots of the rule I have argued that centuries later we should reconsider the need 
for the tree that they have sprouted. To my mind Nicolette, both as an individual and as a 
representative of our times, should not have to suffer the misery of Isabel and her era.
Piecing together disparate historical and cultural materials, I have attempted to portray the 
particular contexts of the birth of the very rule that strives to avoid context. I have tried not to 
take the rule for granted, not to accept its existence as natural or neutral. I have treated 
Coke’s words in the Countess of Rutland’s Case along the lines of New Historicism, as a 
textual unit about texts and their importance and, more implicitly, about contexts and their 
exclusion.
The fact that over four centuries this textual unit, which once formed the parol evidence rule, 
has survived the changing times and has played a continuous role in a shifting contractual 
doctrine is extremely meaningful: it bridges Nicolette and Isabel’s stories and transforms the 
journey taken here from a mere search for the past to an exposure of a new understanding of 
the present. This journey has, in a nutshell, the flavor of Foucault’s Genealogy226: nothing 
that we know today is simply here, and therefore, in order to better understand the meaning 
and necessity of the 21st century’s parol evidence rule, we better search where did it come 
from. 
My reading of the Case’s textual unit in and against its context suggests that it played a 
double role: concurrently reflective and productive, simultaneously passive and active, both a 
mirror and a torch. On the one hand, through close reading of the text, I have offered to view 
the text as inertly representing the values that were highly admired within the legal culture of 
Coke’s days. On the other hand, by exploring Coke’s motives I have suggested observing this 
226 Michel Foucault, Genealogy and Social Criticism, in THE POSTMODERN TURN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
SOCIAL THEORY 39-  45 (Steven Seidman ed. 1994). Generally genealogy explores what was not evident 
because of the institutionalization of knowledge by those in power.
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text as an active player within the same legal culture, as one that was intentionally designed 
to shape that legal culture. 
I do hope that a deeper acquaintance with the circumstances of the birth of the parol evidence 
rule, as offered here, makes it possible to better appreciate the motives that led to its 
formation. It is, after all, a crucial advantage of the New Historicist practice: knowing the 
particulars has the effect of de-mystifying the myth. My desire is that from this same well-
informed standpoint, it will now be easier to feel confident enough to admit the rule’s 
artificiality and biased nature, and to reappraise its necessity. I also hope that this analysis 
has produced a further argument, original and useful, against excessive formalist textualism 
in present-day contract law.
